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Abstract
The Resurrection of the Author
By Joseph Daniel Trainor-McKinnon
Abstract:  In  The  Resurrection  of  the  Author,  Daniel  Trainor-McKinnon
supports a form of intentionalism by arguing that intentions and meaning are
metaphysically separate from artworks. This  form of intentionalism is what he
calls  externalist intentionalism, which is the theory of art interpretation that
holds  that  intentions  are  often  relevant  (though  not  always  necessary)  to
understanding artworks. Because it holds this, externalist intentionalism is an
adequate  response  to  both  the  anti-intentionalist  objection  that  artists'
intentions are inadmissible in critical examinations of artworks because they
are external to those artworks, and the neo-Wittgensteinian intentionalist claim
that  intentions  are  internal  properties  of  artworks.  A consequent  study  of
allusion shows that some features of art are dependent on intentions for their
existence  and  correct  interpretation,  while  a  concluding  section  examines
externalist intentionalism's compatibility with evaluative criticism.
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In  this  Master's  thesis,  I  will  argue  that  the  intentions  of  artists  are  relevant  to
understanding what their artworks mean.1 This thesis is aimed at unifying the practice of
art  criticism,  and since  the  primary focus  of  the  aesthetic  criticism of  literature  is  to
inform audiences “what a literary work means,” I believe it is uncontroversial and apt that
criticism of other art forms should require the same focus.2 This thesis is relevant to the
study  of  aesthetics,  but  also  has  ramifications  for  the  studies  of  English  literature,
metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics. While I do not argue that artists' intentions are the
sole  or  necessarily  primary  focus  of  criticism,  I  do  argue  that  in  most  cases  artists'
intentions and our appeals to them in criticism inform our understanding and enjoyment
of those works,  and that  for the sake of understanding artworks,  intentions belong in
discussions of what artworks (specifically and in general) mean.
Over  the  course of  my argument,  I  aim to  bring  clarity  to  some of  the  more
confusing foundational aspects of aesthetics.  I hope to reconcile inconsistencies in the
literature, and make definitions of certain concepts and positions less ambiguous. I aim
1 Some time before I titled this thesis, William Irwin anticipated the play on Roland Barthes's title “The 
Death of the Author” with the title of his book The Death and Resurrection of the Author?, ed. William 
Irwin, (Westport, Connecticut and London: Greenwood Press, 2002).
2 Monroe C. Beardsley, “The Authority of the Text,” in Intention and Interpretation, ed. Gary Iseminger
(Philadelphia:  Temple University Press,  1992),  pp.  24-25.  Though I  will  not  argue that  the  aim of
criticism of all forms of art ought to be just defining what works mean, since all forms of criticism focus
on  meaning  in  works  to  some  degree,  this  thesis  is  relevant  to  both  evaluative  and  informational
criticism. On p. 34 of “The Authority of the Text,” Beardsley argues that critics show us what a work
means and what its textual limits are, in order for us to enjoy the work, and discern whether it is an
aesthetically worthwhile work. This is a two-step focus, first on what a work means, then on informed
enjoyment, where it is understood that the latter depends upon understanding the former.
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for a theory that “provides both the security of the possibility of achieving objective truth
and convergence in  literary interpretation.”3 The version of intentionalism I  argue for
hinges on the claim that works of art  are metaphysically distinct from intentions  and
meaning. It is my contention that no works of art can contain meaning; rather, they are
physical  collections  of  symbols  that  users  of  aesthetic  languages  will  perceive  as
representations of meaning. Art conveys meaning through the use of its symbols – alone
and in combination with other symbols – and we all share similar enough concepts of
what certain symbols mean, given the broader contexts in which they appear, to decode
meaning from artworks' physical features. I will show that this parsimonious conception
of  art's  metaphysics  is  compatible  with  intentionalism,  even  though  some  of
intentionalism's detractors use this conception against intentionalism.4 One should note
that I will use work, work of art, art object, and artwork interchangeably throughout.
1.2 Intentionalism
Intentionalism is the view “that reference to intention is relevant and legitimate” in the
interpretation and critical  understanding of works of art.5 This term best describes the
view I propose to defend. While intentionalism could be formulated in different ways, so
3 Richard Shusterman, “Interpretation, Intention, and Truth,” in Intention and Interpretation, p. 67.
4 Noël  Carroll,  “Art,  Intention, and Conversation,” in  Beyond Aesthetics:  Philosophical  Essays (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 170 and throughout. Carroll objects to arguments that deny
intentionalism based on art's operating differently from other forms of language, in such a way that art
cannot mean or provide a definite meaning. His argument for understanding art as we do language has
influenced my concept of art considerably, though he does not support a non-meaning concept of art like
I do. I describe my argument as parsimonious because it does not allow for unnecessary metaphysical
properties of art. The principle of parsimony is also known as Ockham's Razor, though the attribution to
William of Ockham might be mistaken. See Stuart Brock and Edwin Mares, Realism and Anti-Realism
(Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2007), p. 222.
5 Noël Carroll, “Anglo-American Aesthetics and Contemporary Criticism: Intention and the Hermeneutics
of Suspicion,” in  Beyond Aesthetics, p. 184. I will refer to this paper as “Hermeneutics of Suspicion”
from now on.
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as to value intentions only incidentally or to make intentions the primary focus of the
critical understanding of works, neither implies the view Noël Carroll calls “authorism,”
according to which works of art can  only  be understood by reference to their creators'
intentions.6 Authorism entails  either  that  a  work means what  its  author  intended it  to
mean, or that the only goal of criticism is to understand what the artist intended the work
to mean, or both. What Carroll calls authorism has been called “intentionalism” by some
philosophers, which can make reconciling arguments in the literature difficult.7
Neither intentionalists nor authorists value the life, experiences, and motivations
of  a  given artist  more  than  the  artist's  works.  Such a  view would  be  defended by a
biographical  critic,  which  is  precisely  the  sort  of  view  that  helped  inspire  anti-
intentionalism.8 While an authorist  would see an artwork as meaning exactly what its
artist  intended,  a  biographical  critic  would  see  the  artwork  merely  as  a  means  of
appreciating the life of its author better.
1.3 Anti-Intentionalism
Anti-intentionalism  has  sometimes  been  called  “internalist”  and  “non-intentionalist”
criticism.9 Largely  a  reaction  against  both  biographical  criticism  and  versions  of
6 Carroll, “Hermeneutics of Suspicion,” p. 188.
7 Jason Holt, “The Marginal Life of the Author,” in  Meanings of Art: Essays in Aesthetics (Montreal:
Minkowski Institute Press, 2015), p. 46: “According to intentionalism, the meaning of a text is just what
the  author  intended  it  to  mean....”  Göran  Hermeren,  “Allusions  and  Intentions,”  in  Intention  and
Interpretation. Hermeren says what we call authorism is “an intentionalist approach” (p. 209). Daniel O.
Nathan,  “Irony,  Metaphor,  and  the  Problem  of  Intention,”  in  Intention  and  Interpretation.  Nathan
describes E. D. Hirsch’s authorism as “intentionalistic” (p. 198).
8 Noël Carroll, “Art, Intention, and Conversation,” in Beyond Aesthetics, p. 158.
9 Stephanie Ross,  “Art and Allusion,” in  The Journal of Aesthetics and Art  Criticism,  Vol.  40, No. 1
(Autumn 1981). Ross calls anti-intentionalist views “internalist” and “non-intentionalist” (pp. 62-63).
The former term is also used by Hermeren in “Allusions and Intentions,” p.210.
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intentionalism that incline toward authorism, anti-intentionalism emerged as a prominent
position in criticism following the publication of Wimsatt and Beardsley's seminal paper,
“The Intentional Fallacy,” and later formulations such as that defended by Roland Barthes
in “The Death of the Author.”10 The authors of both papers argue that since works of art
are metaphysically separate from their authors' intentions, those intentions are irrelevant
to criticism.  Barthes's  view is  that  understanding what  a  work of art  means does not
require  understanding  its  author's  intentions  at  all,  whereas  Wimsatt  and  Beardsley's
considered view is that judging the aesthetic worth of artworks should not have anything
to do with their artists' intentions or whether those intentions have been realized in the
artworks.11 I  believe  this  concept  of  the  separation  between intention  and art  can  be
carried further, by separating artworks from the meanings we ascribe to them. This further
separation will  show that anti-intentionalists are wrong to claim that intentions,  being
separate from artworks, are not relevant to artworks.
1.4 What is an Artwork? The Metaphysics of Art
While  Beardsley maintains  that  intentions  are  irrelevant  to  the  worth  of  artworks,  he
argues that whether an object is an artwork at all actually depends upon intentions. He
10 Carroll, “Art, Intention, and Conversation,” p. 158; Denis Dutton, The Art Instinct: Beauty, Pleasure &
Human  Evolution, (New  York:  Bloomsbury  Press,  2010)  pp.  167-168;  Mary  Mothersill,  Beauty
Restored, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), p. 14. W. K. Wimsatt, Jr. and Monroe C. Beardsley, “The
Intentional Fallacy,” in  Philosophy Looks at the Arts: Contemporary Readings in Aesthetics, 3rd edn.,
ed. Joseph Margolis (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987), pp. 367-380. Roland Barthes, “The
Death of the Author,” in  The Philosophy of Art: Readings Ancient and Modern, eds. Alex Neill and
Aaron Ridley (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1995), pp. 386-390. Of influence comparable to Barthes's
work is Michel Foucault's  “What is an Author?” in  Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected
Essays and Interviews, ed. Donald F. Bouchard, Trans. Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon (Ithaca,
New York: Cornell University Press, 1977), p. 113.
11 Wimsatt and Beardsley, “The Intentional Fallacy,” p. 369.
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says “an artwork is something produced with the intention of giving it the capacity to
satisfy the aesthetic interest.”12 His definition is convincing, because it denies that objects
like rocks are artworks, while affirming that even marginal intentions to satisfy aesthetic
interest are sufficient to classify the resulting object as an artwork. If his account were to
allow for non-intentional processes (like volcanic eruptions) to produce art,  we would
have to accept every object in existence as an artwork, which would be absurd. Yet if the
only objects that count as artworks were limited to those which were produced primarily
as a result of aesthetic intentions, Dadism, politically charged art, many forms of modern
art, some abstract art, art produced with the primary intention to make money or gain
fame,  and art  generated  randomly by human-designed  computer  programs would  not
count as art. With this in mind, I take it that the term  artwork applies to most objects
created by people.13 Though it is unlikely that Beardsley intends this term to apply to
common household objects, even the choice whether to engrave a knife's handle is (in
most cases) based upon aesthetic preference, and so most artifacts (human-made objects),
having  been  created  with  some  aesthetic  intention,  are  able  to  be  appreciated
aesthetically.14
I will not attempt to define the exact limits of what an artwork can be, though we
could delineate between high art – art created by an artist with the primary intention of
creating something aesthetically pleasing – and low art – art that is produced as a result of
12 Monroe Beardsley, “An Aesthetic Definition of Art,” in  What is Art?, ed. Hugh Curtler (New York:
Haven Publications, 1983), p. 21.
13 The idea that most human-made objects count as art is not new. “In the middle ages, an art was merely
the correct way of making or doing whatever one happened to be making or doing.” Noël Carroll, On
Criticism (New York: Routledge - Taylor & Francis Group, 2009), p. 11. See also Larry Shiner's  The
Invention of Art: a Cultural History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001).
14 Beardsley, “An Aesthetic Definition of Art,” pp. 25, 27.
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some other primary intention, like persuading others politically, or earning money. It is
even remotely possible that  any human-created object must contain some aesthetically
appreciable feature, and so count as art, but such a broad extension could pose problems
for any account of art. If objects are not determined to be works of art based on artists'
intentions to create aesthetically appreciable features, there would be no reason to deny
that  natural  objects  (like  trees  and  the  sky)  are  works  of  art.  This  being  so,  the
determination that something is an artwork must be based on the intentions that its creator
had while creating it, not on what its physical features are.15 Though I will not argue for
any specific system like this, my reason for thinking as I do about artifacts and artworks
will become clearer upon further analysis of the metaphysical structure of artworks in this
subsection and the next.16
To say that a work of art has a metaphysical property or component is to say that
there is something it contains that is not perceivable by one's physical senses. Defining
what, if any, metaphysical properties a work of art can have helps to determine what
theory of criticism (e.g., intentionalism, anti-intentionalism, authorism) is  most useful for
understanding what individual works of art mean. Since I aim for a parsimonious theory
of  art,  I  will  focus  on  redefining  what  artworks  are  without  invoking  unnecessary
metaphysical  properties.17 I  believe  we can limit  the properties  we regard  as  existing
15 Some randomly generated works, such as images made by computers, would still count as art, because
someone intended to create the program that generated them.
16 In the cases of ballets and other live performances, the performance itself is treated as an object for the
sake of interpretation and appreciation, though it is actually a sequence of actions, usually based on a
shared plan. It is not the plan that audiences see, but the performance of actions in an attempt to satisfy
the plan's goals and constraints. A ballet is not a metaphysical object, but can exist as a mental object in
the  minds  of  audience  members,  which  requires  the  use  of  memory and  interpretation  in  order  to
adequately appreciate.
17 I  aim  for  a  parsimonious  theory  of  art  because  many theories  (artistic  and  otherwise)  fail  due  to
unnecessary claims. Most arguments for the existence of god(s) fall into this category, where time and
7 The Resurrection of the Author    Daniel Trainor-McKinnon
within (as part of) artworks only to those that are visible to the naked eye, audible to the
ear,  or  otherwise  available  to  the  remaining  senses.   I  call  these  properties  physical
features, and I propose that they are the only internal properties of works of art. Anything
that can be distinguished from the physical features of a work of art is not part of that
work of art. The titles of artworks are, at times, inseparable from the works to which they
refer – as in the printed words of poems, books, and (usually) movies' opening or closing
titles – but in the case of songs, sculptures, paintings, and dance, while titles can help to
guide our interpretation and appreciation of them, they are not necessary components of
our appreciation.  Starry Night is beautiful, and would remain so even if it were called
Blue and Yellow Paint, Painting for an Ear Given to a Prostitute, or even left untitled, in
spite of the fact that we might frame the work differently in our minds in light of such
alternatives. The title “Guernica” helps one to understand what the painting Guernica is
about, but the physical features of the painting would remain unchanged if the title were
missing. Cubist figures with expressions of pain remain on the canvass, and though the
title  helps  to  contextualize  what  was  in  Picasso's  mind  when  he  created  it,  and
accordingly what the figures and their expressions are supposed to represent, we could
accurately describe the severity and anguish we attribute to the painting even if it were
left untitled. If it were a bland painting, the title  Guernica could not make it powerful.
Likewise, if the title were somehow lost, it is possible that modern audiences wouldn't
understand its political significance. Even the determination that a painting is beautiful,
powerful, bland, or about an ear is separate from the physical features of the painting
matter seem to depend on something creating them, but the details advocates attribute to the god(s) in
question are extravagant enough to be almost certainly false.
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itself.18 We may find a certain work delicate, pleasant, or ugly, but if the properties of
delicacy, pleasantness or ugliness exist in works, they must be self-evident, or able to be
discovered through examination. That is, unless delicate, pleasant, ugly and so on are just
terms we use to categorize certain combinations of physical features (artworks or their
components), we must be able to find those qualities within artworks.
Frank Sibley says that aesthetic qualities like these are perceivable in works of art,
as  emergent  from the  physical  “non-aesthetic”  features  of  artworks.19 To  Sibley,  the
application of aesthetic terms to works, or parts of works, is not “in accordance with a set
of necessary and sufficient conditions,” because aesthetic qualities do not require specific
physical features (or groups of features) to make them apparent.20 For example, a graceful
painting doesn't need to have the same colours or line shapes as other graceful paintings,
just as energetic music doesn't have to be fast. Despite this, Sibley maintains that there are
some physical features which ensure that certain aesthetic qualities cannot be present in a
work, and so aesthetic qualities can be negatively governed by conditions.21 He contends
that aesthetic qualities are tertiary properties of artworks that we can perceive, and that
critics can help others to perceive these qualities by drawing attention to the physical
18 Likewise, liner notes of musical albums, lyric sheets, blueprints of houses, sketches of paintings, and
sequels of novels are all separate from what we can conceptually tie together. Our conception of them as
being related is not the same as their actually being metaphysically inseparable, since the latter would
entail that fictional characters in books exist separately from the pages they're written on, that songs
contain non-sonic information (verbal language in songs is still sonic), and that photographs actually
contain specific people and not just shades of light that represent people, which would be absurd.
19 Frank Sibley, “Aesthetic Concepts,” in The Philosophical Review, Vol. 68, No. 4 (Oct. 1959), pp. 421,
424, 440. For further elaboration of Sibley's argument, see his  “Aesthetic Concepts: A Rejoinder,” in
The Philosophical Review, Vol. 72, No. 1 (Jan. 1963), pp. 79-83; and the entry “Sibley, Frank” by John
MacKinnon in  the  Encyclopedia  of  Aesthetics  (2nd edition),  ed.  Michael  Kelly (New York:  Oxford
University Press, 2014).  For more on the metaphysics of aesthetic qualities, see  Nick Zangwill,  The
Metaphysics of Beauty (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), pp. 82-87.
20 Sibley, “Aesthetic Concepts,” p. 424.
21 Ibid., p. 430.
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features of works upon which these qualities depend.22 This attention, he continues, must
be directed at the artworks in question, and not just at critics' descriptions of their physical
features,  however  detailed.  In  some  cases,  this  could  encourage  us  to  doubt  critics'
attributions of aesthetic qualities to works we haven't seen.23 The ability to perceive a
work's  aesthetic  qualities  –  a  capacity  Sibley  calls  taste –  is  akin  to  the  ordinary
perception of physical features, though taste enables us to perceive the aesthetic qualities
that emerge from purely physical properties.24 But this emergence seems to imply that
aesthetic qualities are metaphysical properties of artworks, and not just terms we assign to
groups of physical features in artworks. If a work's properties include aesthetic qualities,
these qualities must not change over the course of time or in different contexts, if we can
claim to know anything about artworks. Aesthetic qualities seem linked to the meaning of
artworks.  We certainly describe artworks as if  aesthetic  qualities belong to them, and
these descriptions can help to inform others about what artworks mean. But since, along
with the terms we use, our perceptions of the aesthetic qualities of artworks can change
through  time  and  in  different  contexts,  it  is  likely either  that  we  cannot  know what
artworks  mean  because  aesthetic  qualities  only  exist  within  artworks  metaphysically
(non-physically),  or we can know what artworks mean because aesthetic qualities are
22 Ibid., p. 440, where Sibley says that often the critic's task “is simply to help us appreciate qualities
which other critics have regularly found in the work” being discussed (my emphasis).
23 Ibid.
24 Frank Sibley, “Aesthetic and Nonaesthetic,” in The Philosophical Review, Vol. 74, No. 2 (Apr. 1965), p.
143. This usage of taste is found throughout “Aesthetic Concepts” as well.
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only terms  we use  to  categorize  particular  groups  of  physical  features.25 For  various
reasons, I opt for the latter.
It  is  more  credible  that  aesthetic  terms  like  grace and  beauty are  linguistic
categories,  since  cultures  over  time  or  across  borders  can  defend  different  and  even
contradictory views about what counts as graceful or beautiful. Just as the majority of Van
Gogh's works went largely unappreciated in his lifetime, few would consider any of his
paintings unfit for any gallery's wall now.26 Likewise, a dance that appears graceful at the
beginning  of  a  competition  could,  after  more  graceful  dances  have  been  performed,
appear less accomplished than it had previously, perhaps even to the extent that it appears
distinctly ungraceful. One could object that grace and beauty admit of degrees. But if
such a term can be applied to two works with opposite features at two different times or in
two different  social  contexts,  this  objection is  refuted.  And the term  beautiful, in  the
context of describing feminine forms, has been applied in precisely such a way. Over the
course of Western history, in mainstream art and culture, the term  feminine beauty has
been associated with slight obesity, near-anorexia, and (as of 2018's current pop-culture)
neither. Unless paintings of anorexic and obese female figures are, paradoxically, both
ideal examples of the aesthetic quality of feminine beauty, the quality of feminine beauty
does not exist outside of cultural values and group opinions. Since people in different
25 This position does not deny the claim that in many cases certain aesthetic terms are apt descriptions of
artworks. We perceive physical features of an artwork through our senses, and the combinations of those
features can often be categorized easily and without argument. I'm just proposing that what don't exist
are the metaphysical qualities that correspond to these terms.
26 The view that Van Gogh was completely unappreciated in his own time has recently been disputed. See
Martin Bailey, Starry Night: Van Gogh at the Asylum, (London: White Lion Publishing, 2018); Hannah
Furness, “A Neglected Genius? Van Gogh Was on the Brink of Success, New Research Suggests,” in
The  National  Post (published  online,  August  28,  2018;  retrieved  September  22,  2018:
nationalpost.com/news/world/a-neglected-genius-van-gogh-was-on-the-brink-of-success-new-research-
suggests).
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generations claim that the same aesthetic quality is present in artworks that have radically
different  physical  features,  the  aesthetic  qualities  they  perceive  must  only  exist  as
concepts external to works, which are prone to changes of opinion, and are not based on
refinements of judgment.27
Furthermore,  if  aesthetic  qualities  do  not  exist  in  any more  substantial  sense,
disagreements over what aesthetic qualities belong to particular works of art could be
construed as problems of definition. If I say some artwork is beautiful, but you disagree,
we might just be operating with different definitions of the term beautiful, or perhaps a
different  conception  of  what  genre  or  tradition  the  work  is  best  categorized  in,  and
therefore what guidelines are most appropriate for determining whether it is beautiful.
Finally,  if  aesthetic qualities do not exist  within artworks,  the number of non-
physical qualities a work of art can have is reduced, which could help guide interpretive
practices away from unnecessary categorization and untenable attributions of intentions to
artists.28 If I am right, the claim that aesthetic qualities are external to artworks could help
resolve conflicting critical accounts of works that share the same basic analysis of their
respective works' physical features. But there is a further claim about the metaphysics of
art that is important to make, namely, that meaning itself is external to artworks.
27 The same could be said of one generation attributing a quality to an artwork, and another attributing the
opposite quality to it.
28 One might still say that a work of art has the metaphysical property of being a work of art, which is of
course determined by intentions rather than its features.
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1.5 The Problem of Meaning
The concept of the metaphysics of art I am defending could lead comfortably into the
anti-intentionalist  position.  While  I  hold that  intentions often matter in discussions of
what  artworks  mean,  I  find  myself  led  to  the  paradoxical  conclusion  that  objective
meaning does not exist at all.  To avoid succumbing to an aesthetic version of one of
Zeno's paradoxes – that the more closely we examine art, the more objective meaning
appears to elude us – I propose three potential solutions, two of which are incompatible
but plausible, one of which is implausible but unifying.  Either meaning is external to
works, a mixed property existing between works and intentions, or an internal property of
works. Each view presents problems.
First, if meaning is external, finding out what a work of art means depends upon
what we would normally term external information. While it is likely insufficient to find
external  information  to  support  a  claim about  a  work  of  art,  external  information  is
nonetheless necessary, though how we define external information is important here. The
meanings of words, phrases, represented actions, and so on, are all kinds of information
external to any given work of art. Internal information that cannot mean is still important.
For instance,  physical qualities can be arranged in a certain way,  such that,  with our
understanding of external meaning, we can see how these internal properties limit the
meaning we consider a work of art to have. External information is necessary, but internal
properties are what make us go looking for meaning in the first place. Perhaps each work
of art is like a map, with which we, the explorers of meaning, guide ourselves in an effort
to find those meanings to which the work's physical features correspond. In keeping with
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this  idea,  both  internal  and  external  information  are  necessary  for  us  to  understand
artworks, but only together are they sufficient. This external view of meaning has the
potential to diminish the importance of focusing on the artworks at hand.
Second, if meaning is a mixed property, it somehow exists  between, but not  in,
either  works  or  their  artist's  intentions.  In  such  a  case,  intentions  are  part  of  the
metaphysical  structure  of  artworks,  such  that  we  ought  to  conceptualize  artworks  as
special  entities  involving  connections  between  objects  we  can  perceive  and  artists'
intentions that we cannot. While this could be a correct view of art's metaphysics, it is
both  counter-intuitive  and  unparsimonious.  If  meaning  is  a  property  that  exists  only
partially inside a work of art,  we wouldn't  be able to understand what  a work of art
means,  even  in  light  of  rigorous  physical  examination.  And  the  requirement  that  we
consult an external meaning object when the object at hand already has meaning seems,
frankly,  absurd.  This  would  mean  that  a  work  of  art  has  properties  that  it  cannot
physically display, rendering them vaguely occult.29 As such, the burden of proof rests
with the defender of such a view. So, for our purposes, we will assume that meaning does
not exist or operate in this way.
Third,  if  meaning is internal,  all works of art  must contain some metaphysical
property of meaning. Yet, it remains to be seen how that property is created by physical
29 It  could  also  be  the  case  that  many concepts  like  ownership  and  parenthood  are  of  metaphysical
properties.  While I believe my attitudes toward people and things,  whether  governed by instinct  or
intellect, are only attitudes, it could be the case that they are grounded in metaphysical properties that
exist within or between objects. But, if this is so, it is unclear how I can make an object mine as opposed
to an object that I and others have certain attitudes and manifest certain behaviours toward. Likewise, it
is only true that I am my parents' child in that my genes are made of my parents' genetic material, and
they have certain attitudes and manifest certain behaviours toward me. This apparent link, however
strong, could be forged by using an imposter who looked, sounded, and acted just like me, as evidenced
by our ability to associate images, voices from phones, and videos, with the actual people represented by
the coding and electrical impulses being transmitted through wires and the air.
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actions. Furthermore, it is unclear on this view how any work of art's meaning can remain
uncertain after extensive examination. Perhaps certain meanings of words and qualities
are  transferred  to  an  artwork  during  the  process  of  creating  it,  but  this  seems
metaphysically  dubious.  If  meaning  is  not  transferred  from an artist  to  a  work,  it  is
unclear  how  works  get  meaning.  But  if  a  metaphysical  property  (meaning)  can  be
transferred  from an artist  to  a  work,  we could  understand a  work's  meaning without
looking at it.  Compatible with this is what Carroll calls the neo-Wittgensteinian view,
according to which “an intention is thought to be a purpose, manifest in the artwork, that
regulates  the  way  the  artwork  is.  Authorial  intention,  then,  is  discoverable  by  the
inspection and contemplation of the work itself.”30 While Carroll  regards this view as
providing support for intentionalism, it could also lend credence to the anti-intentionalist
view that we don't need external information in order to understand works of art. Even if
intentions are discoverable in works, this does not mean that the external information of
authors'  reports of their  intentions add anything to strictly work-focused criticism. An
advocate  of  this  view  would  say  that  since  artworks  contain  intentions,  artists'
explanations  of  their  works  are  external  to  those  works,  so  any  recourse  to  such
explanations is irrelevant to work-focused criticism.  This problem is among the main
reasons I argue that works of art are separate from meaning and their creators' intentions.
Further,  while  the  examination of  certain works  of  art  (and their  components)
could provide audiences and critics with insights into what their artists intended them to
mean, in practice these examinations can also support views diametrically opposed to
their  artists'  intentions. Jean-Xavier de Lestrade's grisly true-crime documentary series
30 Carroll, “Art, Intention, and Conversation,” p.160, my emphasis.
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The Staircase  tells  the  story of  a  man  convicted  of  murder  in  his  wife's  death  on  a
staircase, but its nearly exclusive focus on his side of the story, his legal team, their trial
preparation, and their grounds for maintaining his innocence actually serve to encourage
an  assumption  of  guilt.31 Lestrade's  decision  to  show  the  legal  team's  lengthy
brainstorming sessions makes it look like he intends to demonstrate the lengths a legal
team will go to in order to provide shaky alternative narratives, just as the editing of the
series makes it apparent that the many surprises that accompany the preparation of the
case and trial – including the discovery that another person the man once lived with died
on a staircase – support a guilty verdict. It shocked me when, in later interviews, Lestrade
said the documentary was intended to prove the man's innocence. Even under scrutiny,
the physical features of the series appear gradually to move one toward what seems the
inevitable conclusion: motive, action, and guilt. This example confirms that artists can
make works for purposes that are not discoverable by inspection and contemplation of
their works alone, and that the physical features of works can even suggest interpretations
directly  opposed  to  the  meaning  their  artists  intend.32 Unless  meaning  is  created
independently of artists' intentions – in which case we have no good explanation of how
meaning is created at all – it looks like meaning is not discoverable in all works of art,
even with intense scrutiny. If purposes can fail,  if  the meanings of some works of art
31 Jean-Xavier de Lestrade,  The Staircase (Maha Productions: Docurama, 2011, DVD). This verdict has
since been downgraded from murder to voluntary manslaughter, following an Alford plea in a retrial
(see  Wikipedia.org:  en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Staircase).  My  further  opinions  about  the  case  and
verdict are impressions based on the documentary series as of 2011, not accusations or extra-judicial
determinations of guilt.
32 If  one  wonders  whether  a  documentary  can  count  as  art,  one  must  consider  that  documentary
filmmakers make choices on how they frame shots, what scenes to include, where in a scene to edit, and
how to bring disparate locations and time frames together in order to tell a story. That being so, it's
unclear whether a well-made documentary convinces one of what the filmmakers think, or even displays
any obvious signs of intention at all, and I won't attempt to argue for this.
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continue to elude us, and if even artists have no extra insight into what their works mean,
we are left  wondering whether  internal  meaning exists.  If  it  is  true that  works of art
contain their own internal meanings, we might have to concede that we cannot discover
those meanings.
This brings us back to the first potential solution to the problem of meaning, that it
is  external  to  works  of  art,  and  that  external  information  is  therefore  necessary  for
interpreting  works  of  art.  I  call  this  externalist  intentionalism,  because  on  this  view,
meaning is external to works, such that intentions are relevant to discerning the meanings
we consider works of art to have. The externalist intentionalist maintains that works of art
are  constituted  by  physical  qualities  (appearance,  sound,  etc.)  as  a  result  of  artists'
intentions (which can also fail to be realized in works), and that meanings and intentions
are metaphysically distinct  from their  successful  physical  representations  in  artworks.
This explains why people often understand artworks in different ways, without their being
wrong in their judgments about these works.33 This does not necessarily mean that works
of art cannot contain features that we count as having meaning: a poet writes words, and
we can examine what the poet means by her use of those words, what a dictionary at a
certain time defines those words to mean, what average people think those words mean,
what a well-informed critic of that poet's work thinks those words mean, and so on.
Someone  might  object  that  this  focus  on  external  information  undermines  the
sensible view that criticism and determinations of meaning in works ought to focus on the
artworks in question. One could respond, however, that in the same way that we need to
33 A couple of examples of common misinterpretations include critics' attributions of features or qualities
to works that do not exist as part of these works, and misunderstanding certain symbols in works.
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consult dictionaries and experienced speakers of foreign languages in order to understand
those  languages,  we need  to  consult  aesthetic  dictionaries  (of  a  sort)  –  which  could
include relevant criticism – and experienced creators of artworks, in order to understand
what  certain  physical  features  mean  in  works  with  whose  form  or  genre  we  are
unfamiliar. This seems a compelling view of how we pursue knowledge of what specific
works  mean.  Since,  in  these pursuits,  our  focus  remains  on determining what  works'
physical features and aesthetic qualities mean, given the context in which the works are
situated, instead of pushing the study of works to the side, we are actually trying to gain
knowledge of the work before us.34 But this is not to say that the definite meaning of a
work of art exists between the external meanings of its physical features and the artwork
taken as a whole. The meaning we ascribe to the physical features of an artwork is limited
by those features, whereas any additional framing, contextualization, or linguistic insight,
though grounded in the work's features and aesthetic qualities, only helps to define what
we consider the artwork's aesthetic qualities to be, and what the work taken as a whole
means.35 If  meaning is  internal,  we don't  need any dictionaries;  if  meaning is  mixed,
34 Many aesthetic qualities would be obvious to any observer. A photorealistic painting of a smiling person
is  actually  just  a  collection  of  paint  drops,  but  the  smiling  person  is  something  observers  derive
immediately from it, which means the smiling person is a kind of aesthetic quality. While it is not true to
say that the painting contains a smiling person, it is true to say that the drops of paint, so organized,
represent a smiling person, so that the painting is either of a smiling person, or contains a representation
of a smiling person. Many shapes and concepts (e.g., human beings and happiness) can be symbolized
in such a way that our own concepts or intuitions immediately recognize them, without us having to
spend time contemplating what they mean. With more complex, obscure, or allusive representations,
further analysis of the physical features of such a work (and likely further external information) would
be necessary in order to determine what they mean. In many cases, it might be impossible to determine
such meaning.  The splotches of paint look like a person is a true statement.  The splotches of paint
represent a person is a statement that is more or less likely to be true based on the physical features of a
work. In the case of photorealistic art, it is overwhelmingly likely that certain forms represent what they
look like. Only in the case of a photorealistic sketch of a photorealistic sketch could one misunderstand
what the sketch's features represent.
35 I say “consider” here because there doesn't  seem to be any way in any theory to accurately claim
knowledge of what a work means, in its totality. It is likely that a painting of a smiling person represents
a specific person who was, at the time the painting was made, happy. We can have knowledge about
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dictionaries  are  incomplete;  and  if  externalist  intentionalism  is  accurate,  we  might
eventually be able to compile a dictionary that can guide interpretations of artworks and
their features toward the determination of objective truths of works' meanings.
Perhaps meaning is created when an artist makes use of shapes, chords, or words
and phrases with accepted meanings (or special personal meanings) to create physical
features we regard as having meaning in works.36 This could explain why certain works of
art are hard to understand: either the hypothetical aesthetic dictionaries relied on by their
artists are complex, or these artists attach special meaning to certain features or qualities
that ordinary observers do not. Perhaps the artists are not playing the same language game
the audience is, which could explain why some artists like their own works while few
others do, and  why different people like different artworks.37 We all share at least one
general language in order to represent ideas to each other. Yet what we perceive as the
meanings of words can vary from and conflict with the meanings others perceive, so our
conversations are prone to misunderstandings. As in art, conversation relies on material
physical features of artworks, and the more obvious qualities, such as the those described in the footnote
above, but further knowledge requires certainty, and like our knowledge of other peoples' minds, there is
no way to attain certain knowledge about them. Most intelligently made statements about works are
likely true, but the likelihood of truth does not ensure perfect accuracy. This being so, we have two
objects: the essentially meaningless work in front of us, and the idea of the meaning it has, which we
ascribe  to  the work  as  if  it  could  contain it,  based  on conclusions (which are  sometimes aesthetic
qualities) reached by unconscious or conscious arguments we derive from its features and other external
information. It is this more accurate view of works' meanings that I refer to when I say a work of art (or
a feature of it)  means x. We can only use our mental concepts to confirm or deny the truth of any
statement, and, as such, cannot perceive the world perfectly objectively. However, it is possible that we
can define the features, aesthetic qualities, and other properties of a work to such a degree that the most
accurate idea of meaning we attribute to such a work is almost perfectly objectively accurate.
36 In “The Death of the Author,” Roland Barthes seems to argue that the idea of reusing words and phrases
supports anti-intentionalism by denying unique aesthetic intentions, which seems absurd.
37 This recalls Carroll's argument for understanding art as we understand language, in “Art, Intention, and
Conversation.”
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features (text, speech, facial expressions, body-language, etc.) that enable us to share, but
also to confuse, ideas.
Sometimes,  however,  what  we are  trying  to  understand is  not  what  a  speaker
means by certain words, but what those words mean independent of a speaker's will. In
these cases, we are asking what the expression of a speaker's intention means – which can
be misused, and indeed be at odds with, what the speaker means – not what the speaker's
intention is. The expression itself  (a word or sentence) may appear to contain all  the
information we need to determine its meaning, but it only contains properties that are
understandable with reference to external information,  such as what certain usages of
letters  and  words  mean.  Audience  members  can  only  use  their  own  private  mental
dictionaries  (perhaps based on public  dictionaries),  which contain general  and special
context-dependent rules and definitions that could differ from the rules and definitions in
other members' dictionaries.
If  we  are  naturally  equipped  with  certain  concepts  in  our  minds,  the  idea  of
aesthetic meaning as a kind of language may not be credible. That is, if we share certain
concepts innately, it could be the case that we do not need specialized knowledge in order
to determine what certain works of art mean. But an objection of this kind could only
apply to the most elementary works of art. Even though it is accurate to say that we have
ingrained in us certain concepts that we can't help but ascribe to certain physical features
– such as  grisly to describe skin damage and blood in a movie, without us needing to
examine the basis upon which we conclude it to be so – it seems reasonable to conclude
that these ascriptions of aesthetic qualities reflect a kind of subliminal or unconscious
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reasoning process. In such cases, we only see the physical evidence for a determination
(in this case blood and skin damage) and the determination itself (the quality; in this case,
grisliness), usually without any conscious awareness of the evidence that supports such an
inference. And our sharing of certain mental concepts in response to certain stimuli does
not entail that all languages are shared. Even if twelve people in a room try to converse
about the concept dog, if each person speaks in a language unknown to the other eleven,
the conversation will inevitably end in failure.
In  The  Birth  of  Tragedy,  Nietzsche  identifies  music  as  the  most  emotionally
immediate art, claiming that it can communicate in such a way that it is more universal
than language. As he says, “language,  as organ and symbol of phenomena, can never
reveal the innermost depths of music.”38 Nietzsche is right to insist on the universality of
music, since we seem innately to associate concepts with certain chords and melodies. In
this case, some objective aesthetic truth is possible.
In summary, I have argued in this section that the meaning we ascribe to artworks
is  external  to  them,  that  aesthetic  qualities  are  really  just  aesthetic  terms  or  mental
inferences, and that these claims are not incompatible with the view that intentions can be
important to determining what works of art mean.
38 Friedrich Nietzsche,  The Birth of Tragedy, trans. Douglas Smith (New York: Oxford University Press,
2008), notably pp. 41-42, quotation p. 42.
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SECTION 2: Anti-Intentionalism Examined
2.1 Anti-Intentionalism
In this chapter, I will explain the influential anti-intentionalist arguments advanced by W.
K. Wimsatt and Monroe C. Beardsley, and Roland Barthes. Carroll points out that many
proponents of anti-intentionalism defend one of two theses. The first is “the ontological
argument,” according to which “artworks are ontologically different from ordinary words
and deeds, [such that]  different interpretive practices are appropriate to them,” and so
“authorial intent is irrelevant to interpretation.”39 The second is “the aesthetic argument,”
which concludes that we best criticize works without reference to their artists' intentions.40
According  to  Carroll,  while  ontological  arguments  “maintain  that  intentionalism  is,
strictly  speaking,  impossible,  aesthetic  arguments  admit  that  intentionalist  criticism is
possible, but recommend that it not be embraced for what might be called aesthetic policy
reasons.”41 While  a  form of  the  ontological  argument  can  depend upon the  idea  that
intentions  are  separate  from  artworks,  the  aesthetic  argument  does  not.42 Generally,
neither argument denies that artists have the ability to intend. In a kind of extreme anti-
intentionalism,  Socrates  appears,  by contrast,  to  have  argued against  artistic  intention
itself.
39 Carroll, “Art, Intention and Conversation,” p. 161, all quotations.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid., p. 170.
42 Monroe C. Beardsley, “The Authority of the Text.” Beardsley supports the ontological argument on the
grounds that intentions are separate from artworks.
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2.2 Plato's Ion
Plato's  Ion is likely the earliest philosophical work that expresses an anti-intentionalist
view of art. In the dialogue, Socrates argues with Ion about whether performers achieve
mastery in acting, or if their performances are simply channelled through them from the
gods.43 In fact, Ion and Socrates appear to rely on different meanings of  mastery, with
Ion's use referring to mastery of imitation, and Socrates's referring to mastery of the actual
skills being imitated by Ion. And so, Socrates concludes that Ion does not have a skill, but
that the gods provide Ion with the ability to act well. Socrates appears to endorse anti-
intentionalism, since, although one needs intention in order to act skillfully, one need not
have intention to be animated by gods. If we ignore the confusion over mastery, Socrates's
argument  could  be  arranged for  our  purposes  as  follows:  inspiration  causes  artists  to
produce or perform art. Inspiration does not come from oneself. If something else causes
one's  action,  the  action  cannot  be  said  to  be  one's  own.  Thus,  art  is  produced  by
inspiration, not artists.
The problem with this argument is that inspiration can also produce non-artistic
actions, such as those that are aimed at inventing mechanical objects, solving engineering
problems,  and  amending  laws.  Aside  from  the  fact  that  agents  can  choose  which
inspirations to act on, inspirations seem to amount to thoughts that occur to one, without
which no voluntary actions could be performed. Unless we agree with the unparsimonious
claim that inspiration comes from the gods (i.e., outside the mind), we need mental events
to explain the concept of inspiration. Even if mental events constitute a broad category
43 Plato,  Ion,  in  Two Comic  Dialogues:  Ion  and  Hippias  Major, trans.  Paul  Woodruff  (Indianapolis:
Hackett Publishing Company, 1983).
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that includes thought, inspiration, and emotion, it is difficult to determine how inspiration
differs from other ideas, and so how inspiration affects artists' intentions. Emotions, urges,
intuitions, experiences of physical sensations, and subsequent ideas are all unintentional
mental events, which inspire further ideas and actions. But while whatever inspires an
idea or sensation may be unknown, this does not preclude the possibility of intentional
action, since none of these unintentional mental events force one to act in any way. Even
instinct only encourages behaviour. Recoiling in fear from a bee or a charging dog is a
choice, to a certain degree, and determined by one's values – for instance, a concern for
one's safety – and what one thinks will align with one's values. A beekeeper will not recoil
when  bees  fly  nearby,  whereas  someone  who  does  not  like  walnuts  might  recoil  in
displeasure at biting into a walnut dessert. An aggressive-looking dog once charged at me
from across a street. I turned to run, but instead of acting in accordance with my instinct
to flee,  I turned back at  the dog and held out my hand as a stop signal, and the dog
skidded away, running back across the street. That move accomplished one of my values
(avoiding harm), but my action was in direct contradiction to my instinct. Regardless of
whether instinct or intuition inspired the winning alternative in that situation, I was the
one who chose what I would do. Even if I choose an option that my instinct encourages, I
have  the  option  of  ignoring  that  motivation.  This  reinforces  my  assumption  that
inspiration by itself  is  a  kind of mental  event that has no power to force any action,
including  representational  actions  such  as  those  involved  in  art-making.  Art  requires
thought, and some measure of inspiration, but there is no support for the idea that artistic
inspiration works in the way our modified Socratic argument proposes.
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2.3 Anti-Intentionalism in Roland Barthes's “The Death of the Author”
Since inspiration, divine or otherwise, does not remove the intentional agency of artists,
the next avenue of argument for anti-intentionalists is to show that artistic actions are
essentially meaningless. As an advocate of this view, Roland Barthes argues that “[a]s
soon  as  a  fact  is  narrated  no  longer  with  a  view  to  acting  directly  on  reality  but
intransitively, ... the voice loses its origin, the author enters into his own death,” so that
writing becomes only the  “practice of the symbol itself.”44 Barthes, then, distinguishes
between  ordinary  speech-acts  and  non-speech  art-acts,  the  former  of  which  admit  of
intentionalist interpretation, while the latter do not, because they don't  act on reality.45
This line of argument has been foundational to anti-intentionalism, though the notion of
acting on reality is subject to a variety of interpretations.
One  interpretation  is  that  a  work's  maker  does  not  intend  the  work  to  mean
anything to anyone, or to be  about anything. Barthes's discussion of automatic poetry
could support this interpretation.46 If a work is not intended to mean anything, as opposed
to being intended to mean nothing, the most important way to understand it would be to
evaluate the meaning of its physical features (e.g., words, phrases, and overall structure),
in which case Barthes would be correct. There might be some room in interpretation for
historical investigation, if certain phrases or words meant different things at the time the
work was produced than they do now, or if there were compelling reasons to look into the
artist's background to understand special regional uses of such words and phrases, but no
44 Roland Barthes, “The Death of the Author,” p. 386.
45 Ibid.,  p.  386. For useful  discussions of  speech-act  theory,  see Ross,  “Art  and Allusion,” p. 60; and
Shusterman, “Interpretation, Intention, and Truth,” passim.
46 Ibid., passim.
25 The Resurrection of the Author    Daniel Trainor-McKinnon
hidden  meanings  would  be  relevant  to  such  criticism.  Indeed,  with  the  exception  of
psychological studies of the unconscious drives of the author, intention-based criticism of
such works would be inappropriate.47 This would mean that Barthes's argument is merely
suggesting how best to interpret works of this non-intentional kind. While this insight is
valuable, however, it does not reflect a full understanding of Barthes's account.
Another interpretation of not acting on reality is that what we regard as properties
of works of art – e.g., a figure on the left of a canvas, an act of kindness that a character in
a novel performs, etc. – are either not the same as their real-world counterparts, or are not
based on external objects. The argument would go like this: since all intentions are about
real things, and no fiction-acts are about real things, no fiction-acts are intentional. Since
fiction-acts  produce  works  of  fiction,  no  works  of  fiction  are  intentional,  and  thus
intentions are irrelevant to understanding fictional works. But this argument is open to a
strong objection, namely, that an artist's intentions to make certain qualities appear in a
work are about real things. An author writes words (real things) to create a story (a real
thing) on a page (a real thing), and intends to make that story available to the public (real
people).  If  we were to subscribe to this  view, while it  would be impossible to intend
anything about fictional objects,  writers'  intentions to make certain words appear and,
more generally, to write stories could still be relevant to evaluating their works. If we
were to  subscribe to  this  interpretation, did you mean the ring to  be a metaphor for
power? would be an inappropriate question for a critic to ask a writer, but did you mean
to organize the words on the page so that audiences would think words about the ring
47 Ross, “Art and Allusion,” p. 60, where she argues for the value of considering unconscious intentions in
criticism.
26 The Resurrection of the Author    Daniel Trainor-McKinnon
were metaphorically hinting at the public concept of power? would be appropriate. Since
the only important difference between the two questions is that the latter  includes the
notions  words and  story,  this  interpretation  does  not  damage  the  credibility  of
intentionalism.  While  this  is  not  likely  what  Barthes  intended  to  argue,  it  requires
explanation in order to avoid confusing it with what I think Barthes's considered view is.
A final interpretation of  not acting on reality is that works are not produced to
communicate  with  specific  individuals.48 According  to  this  interpretation,  when  one
person speaks to another, that speech is directed at the other, and thus is acting on a real
person. As such, the speech is acting on reality. Since an artist does not speak to a specific
individual through a book, the artist is not acting on reality. Thus, books are not instances
of  ordinary  speech,  and  the  idea  of  judging  books  as  we  judge  speech  is,  in  turn,
inadequate. While Barthes seems to conclude that intention is useless to understanding
and judging literature, there is a fundamental problem with his argument, for there is no
requirement that all intentions to communicate be aimed at people. When stated formally,
the flaw in Barthes's argument is perhaps more apparent:
 1. All speech-acts are actions aimed at actual specific people.
 2. All speech-acts are produced by intentions to communicate.
 Thus, 3. All things produced by intentions to communicate are actions aimed at actual
     specific people.
4. No literature-acts are aimed at actual specific people.
 Thus, 5. No literature-acts are things produced by intentions to communicate.
48 See Carroll,  “Art,  Intention,  and  Conversation,”  p.  162,  where  a  similar  interpretation of  Barthes's
argument is explored.
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6. All things produced by intentions to communicate are things of which we can
    chart the intentions.
 Thus, 7. No literature-acts are things of which we can chart the intentions.
The main problem lies with statement 3,  because there is  nothing in Barthes's
argument that shows us why all things produced by intentions to communicate are actions
aimed at actual specific people. Since this first conclusion is unsupported, even if we
agree that literature-acts or art-acts are different from speech-acts, art-acts could still be
produced by intentions to communicate, and so finding out what an artist intends would
be  permissible  in  criticism  regardless  of  whether  we  could  identify  other  analogues
between  art  and  speech.  Further  analysis  of  Barthes's  argument  reveals  no  adequate
support for the first premise, so we can regard his argument, at least on this interpretation,
as posing an insufficient challenge to intentionalism. What is clear is that either Barthes is
in error when he subscribes to this interpretation, or his goal of liberating the reader is
only meant to apply to readers of non-intentional or automatic works.49
2.4 Beardsley's View
Carroll  claims  that  a  line  of  argument  similar  to  our  final  interpretation  of  Barthes's
argument is taken up by Beardsley.50 According to Beardsley,  literary interpretation is
different from ordinary conversation, because the dramatic speaker in a poem or work of
literature is different from the author of that work.51 For example, when I tell someone my
49 See “The Marginal Life of the Author,” p. 37, where Holt says that “the central purpose of [“The Death
of the Author”] is reader liberation in interpreting texts.”
50 Carroll, “Art, Intention, and Conversation,” p. 162.
51 Beardsley, “The Authority of the Text,” p. 25; Carroll, “Art, Intention, and Conversation,” p. 162.
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life story, I am performing the action of actually telling that person my life story. When I
write a fictional work in which it looks like I'm telling the reader my life story, I am
actually writing a  representation of myself telling someone my life story. Since the one
speaking is not me, but the fictional subject, and since the subject does not have actual
intentions,  only  the  meaning  of  words  and  phrases  on  the  page  are  relevant  to
understanding the work.52 Since the dramatic speaker is speaking, the author is not; and
since only the author has intentions, intention can be ignored in interpretations of the
work's meaning.
An objection to this view is that even if no real subject speaks the words or is
capable of taking the reader as its direct object, the author has performed the actions of
writing, that is, of forming the words in a particular way, which were most likely aimed at
a particular result.53 The dramatic speaker was created by the author, and, as such, is a
representation or reflection of the author's intentions to present the character in that way.54
Even  though  the  dramatic  speaker  does  not  speak  to  the  reader,  the  reader  receives
information all the same, from the words on the page that reflect the author's intentions. A
writer of literature might then be regarded as taking the document being written as a
direct  object,  just  as  one  can  speak  to  a  tape-recorder,  computer,  phone,  watch,  wax
cylinder, or other device. Audiences will demonstrate whether artists' intentions have been
realized by their  understanding of the works at  hand. Since works are  the product of
artists' intentions, it makes sense to look for evidence as to what a work means if it is hard
52 See Carroll, “Art, Intention, and Conversation,” p. 167, which influences much of my explanation here.
53 This is admittedly similar to the objection I offer to the second interpretation of Barthes's argument.
54 With the possible exceptions of automatic writing and works resulting from serious mental illness. And
yet, excepting either could be contentious if we view unconscious intentions as valid in criticism. One
might look at such works as being produced by the unconscious drives of their artists.
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to understand. Artists'  reports  of their  intentions,  while external to works,  can help to
make clear what certain uses of features (words, figures, etc.) mean, and so can resolve
problems of misinterpretation. For example, an artist's claim that the red colour dripping
from a dog's mouth in a painting is supposed to be from the strawberries in the painting,
rather than the blood of its forlorn owner, could help audiences look for other evidence in
the  painting  that  confirms  a  non-morbid  interpretation.  Information  about  artists'
intentions will not help a poorly executed work appear better, nor will it make such a
work's features mean what its artist wants them to mean, but this information can help
elucidate uses of features in complex, well-executed works. This information could also
help audiences to understand what counts as well-executed in a given genre.
In “The Authority of the Text,” Beardsley asks, “what is the primary purpose of
literary interpretation? It is, I would say, to help readers approach literary works from the
aesthetic point of view, that is, with an interest in actualizing their (artistic) goodness.”55
This is his considered view of literary interpretation. And a literary interpreter (critic)
does this, in part, by revealing what a work means.56 We must then ask where the critic
should look for meaning. Beardsley maintains that, while charting intention could have
something  to  do  with  historical  examinations  of  works,  all  works  are  bound  by the
“Principle of Autonomy,” according to which “literary works are self-sufficient entities,
whose properties are decisive in checking interpretations and judgments.”57 On this view,
intentions have no place in criticism because intentions and works are separate. But an
externalist intentionalist can pose a strong objection to Beardsley's view.
55 Beardsley, “The Authority of the Text,” p. 34, his ellipses.
56 Ibid., p. 25.
57 Ibid., pp. 35, 24.
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The meanings of words are external to works, just as intentions are. We understand
words based on their personal, local, historical, and grammatical contexts. Only our usage
of words and grammar determines what the words in our public lexicons mean. Yet if in
ten years the word fish were to mean cat, our fish would not cease to mean fish. It would
just be used in a different way than it is now. Such a change would not make my current
sentence I'm going to buy a fish to eat, mean I'm going to buy a cat to eat, because I do
not currently mean cat by fish. Yet if I were the first to use fish for cat, or were I a speaker
of a dialect that did so, this sentence would be an example of such usage, and the meaning
of my words would be to express my intention to buy a cat for the purpose of eating it. 58
Since  works  are  separate  from  the  meanings  of  their  words,  they  require  external
information in order to make those words understandable. Since works by themselves are
not capable of providing us with meaning, they cannot provide standards upon which to
judge which interpretations of symbols are correct. And because works are the products of
intentional acts, it makes more sense to utilize information about their artists' use of words
than to interpret works' features as symbolizing concepts that language users in particular
locations or belonging to particular generations could not have meant by them.
Beardsley argues that “texts acquire determinate meaning through the interactions
of [their] words without the intervention of an authorial will,”59 but also that confusions of
words'  meanings can be resolved “by supplying further information” about such uses,
which I  gather would be determining what  uses seem appropriate given what a text's
genre or language is.60 But if texts acquire determinate meaning, we shouldn't need any
58 Catfish are excepted from this discussion. <3
59 Beardsley, “The Authority of the Text,” p. 31-32.
60 Ibid., p. 32.
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further  information,  and if  the  information  we rely on to  resolve  confusions  of  what
certain features mean does not come from the work itself,  it  is  external.  If  Beardsley
allows one kind of external information in art interpretation or criticism, it is inconsistent
to exclude other kinds of external information, since it is clear that works are not self-
sufficient.
Carroll  says  that  since  understanding  the  intentions  of  people  is  important  to
understanding what their expressions mean, and since some works of philosophy and non-
fiction can be considered aesthetic works, there is no clear difference between works of
art  and  other  forms  of  expression.61  Among  the  examples  he  cites  are  Lucretius's
Concerning  the  Nature  of  Things and  The  Mahabharata,  which  “both  appear  to  be
illocutionary acts of assertion, even if what they assert turns out to be false.  It does not
seem correct to attribute to Lucretius the intention of representing the illocutionary acts of
an Epicurean philosopher – he was an Epicurean philosopher philosophizing.”62  Because
Beardsley does not define clearly how to distinguish between literature and those cases
where, in his view, intention matters, and since any such rule might arbitrarily call the
worth  of  some  works  into  question,  we  can  consider  this  problem,  for  our  current
purposes, dealt with.
2.5 Wimsatt and Beardsley's Intentional Fallacy
Finally, we come to the argument that Wimsatt and Beardsley pose in their seminal anti-
intentionalist  paper,  “The  Intentional  Fallacy.”   Borrowing  from  Ananda  K.
61 Carroll, “Art, Intention, and Conversation,” p. 165.
62 Ibid.
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Coomaraswamy's discussion of artistic success, they argue that the critic's focus should be
on the worth of the artwork, “whether the work of art ʻaught ever to have been undertaken
at all.ʼ”63 Though Coomaraswamy aims to show that this position is wrong, and that art
criticism ought to be dedicated to determining whether an artist's intentions have been
realized  in  the  work,  Wimsatt  and Beardsley say that  the  former  view of  evaluative
criticism is  the  kind  that  could  “distinguish  between a  skillful  murder  and a  skillful
poem.”64 What they appear to mean is that a murder is always successful, but an artwork
can be the successful realization of its artist's intentions without any observer recognizing
it as skillful.65 It is their aim, then, to establish anti-intentionalism as the best way to judge
the worth of works, rather than their meaning. We might say that a work has more worth
if we conclude that it must have been hard for its artist to create it, or that its creation was
nearly effortless, or perhaps that it was innovative for its time. But Wimsatt and Beardsley
object that any such attempt focuses on the author and not the work.66 To them, intentions
of  artists  are  irrelevant  to  criticism of  their  works.67 However,  irony  in  art  poses  a
particularly important challenge to this view.
It  can  be  difficult  in  some cases  to  determine  what  works  (or  components  of
works)  are  ironic  without  reference  to  artists'  intentions.  If  understanding  artists'
intentions is indeed unnecessary for judging the aesthetic worth of works, it should be
63 Ananda K. Coomaraswamy, as quoted by Wimsatt and Beardsley, “The Intentional Fallacy,” p. 369.
Wimsatt and Beardsley build on Coomaraswamy's view about the moral evaluation of actions and apply
it to the aesthetic worth of works of art.
64 Wimsatt and Beardsley, “The Intentional Fallacy,” p. 369.
65 Wimsatt and Beardsley could be arguing that skillful murder is always bad, but skillful poems are good.
Despite calling their criticism “moral,” this is not likely their meaning (Ibid.). The worthiness of some
art might never adhere to a moral standard, since some works we call beautiful or artistically successful
depict morally reprehensible things, such as Goya's The Shootings of May 3, 1808, in Madrid.
66 Ibid., p. 373.
67 Wimsatt and Beardsley, “The Intentional Fallacy,” passim.
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impossible to be confused about whether certain works are ironic, which clearly is not the
case. I need only recall a friend of mine, who believed that the science-fiction parody
Galaxy Quest was in fact just a bad and unenjoyable attempt at a science-fiction movie, to
remind me of the importance of understanding artists' intentions to judging the worth of
works. An ironic work that gives no hint of its irony might only be rendered worthwhile
or  enjoyable  by  investigating  its  artist's  intentions,  and  then  appreciating  it  as  it  is
intended to be enjoyed. Perhaps there are some cases in which an extensive examination
of the features of such a work provides further evidence of its being badly executed, or
perhaps even worthless,  such that  only knowledge of  its  artist's  intentions  could help
establish it as a well-executed ironic work.68
If  Wimsatt  and  Beardsley  mean  only  that  worth  should  be  determined  by
something other  than whether  artists'  intentions  have been successfully represented in
works, they provide no adequate alternative for us to determine worth. Although they do
not explicitly conclude that worth can only be determined by personal preference, in the
absence of such an adequate alternative, this seems likely. By this, I do not mean that
works are completely open to any kind of interpretation.  Rather,  even in cases where
interpretations are limited, there is no way to determine whether works are worthwhile, or
better than other works. I maintain that there is no incorrect way of enjoying a work, even
68 The opposite can happen as well. See Carroll, “Art, Intention, and Conversation,” pp. 175-177, in which
he discusses  Village Voice film critic J. Hoberman's interpretation of Ed Wood's  Plan 9 from Outer
Space.  Hoberman claims that the movie is unintentionally modernist, because it  transgresses normal
film conventions like narrative coherence.  This  attribution of  irony (transgression) is  unconvincing,
given that  Wood has  never claimed to have  made the film as  a  rebuke to  the  prevailing trends  of
filmmaking at the time. Indeed, the film's failings are more likely due to the financial constraints under
which Wood created films. The discovery that the film was not intended to be taken ironically detracts
from the view that it is well executed.
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though there are incorrect ways of interpreting the meanings of works.69 A Van Gogh
painting, the canvass stretched in its frame, might be pleasing to the ear as a drum, just as
the text of War and Peace might be appreciated as an interesting abstract painting. Both of
these acts of  appreciation, however peculiar, are admissible if, in responding to works,
our only goal is to maximize the pleasure we take from them. But the maximization of
pleasure is not  interpretation.  Carroll objects  to the kind of “aesthetic hedonism” that
“presuppose[s] that aesthetic pleasure or satisfaction is our only legitimate interest” in
art.70 If one were to criticize the  meaning of works in this way, one will have stepped
outside the bounds of personal preference and into the realm of public truth. That is, if
one fails to understand a work as the kind of work it is, one is incapable of making true
claims about what it means, and discussions of a work based on personal enjoyment fail
when the work's qualities are assessed using standards that do not apply to the work's
kind. If worth is a metaphysical property of works, people who enjoy worthless works
would be wrong to do so, despite their own positive reactions. Since it is irrational to
conclude that the works they enjoy do not contain properties that inspire their enjoyment,
it  seems  that,  short  of  endorsing  either  the  view  that  enjoyment  of  the  successful
realization of intentions determines the worth of works, or that enjoyment of the work
itself determines worth, there is no good standard for judging whether a work is good or
bad.
69 I first encountered the concept of correct and incorrect ways of appreciating works in Roger Scruton's
Beauty (New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 2011), pp. 6-7. It could also be the case that enjoyment
depends upon or is diminished by understanding what a given work means.
70 Carroll, “Art, Intention, and Conversation,” quotations on p. 178, and discussion on pp.174-180.
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If worth is an internal property of works, and not just a status we attribute to them
solely for the purpose of communicating information about them to others, it is odd that
some  people  like  worthless  art.  Unless  such  people  just  misunderstand  features  of
artworks,  this  encourages  the  view that  artistic  worth  is  simply a  matter  of  personal
preference. While this view does not support the claim that the  meaning of artworks is
dependent on personal preference, it seems likely that since no one work is universally
hailed as a good or bad work of art,  worth is not an internal property.71 Wimsatt  and
Beardsley's  argument  against  Coomaraswamy's  intention-based  definition  of  success
seems to leave us with no other option than the view that artistic success is determined by
personal or group preference.72
Finally, though their argument against intention's relevance to works relies on the
sensible  claim that  to  explain  a  work is  fundamentally different  than explaining who
created it, there are many objects that we can only understand and appreciate adequately
by knowing what their makers intended them to be.73 Most electronic devices now come
with user manuals to explain what they can be used for, and these manuals, while external
to the objects they refer to, are statements of their creators' intentions.  Though creators
might  fail  to  make something useful,  or at  least  useful  in  the ways they intend,  it  is
obvious that, in some cases, describing an object involves describing its use.
71 While I don't  have empirical evidence that supports the claim that  no work is universally hailed or
condemned, I can't think of a single work that has not been praised by someone. For example, although
most people agree upon which movies  are the worst  ever  made,  those who make such movies  are
unlikely to agree.
72 Of course, even the determination that one finds a work enjoyable ought to be based upon the actual
facts of the work, not a misinterpretation of them. I will return to this preference-based concept of
aesthetic value in section 5.3 of this thesis.
73 See Mothersill, Beauty Restored, p. 16, where she describes the view that intentions explain works as “a
special case of the 'genetic fallacy.'”
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Furthermore, artworks can be made in such a way that our appreciation of them
depends upon obscure external information. If a poem were put into code, an external key
would be required to interpret it properly. That poem would then seem to be a special
case, such that describing its features without the key would fail to convey what it means.
One might object that such a poem could not be counted as just a poem, but also
an interactive performance piece. Even if this were so, the method a critic relies on to
understand and evaluate it would have to involve taking part in the decryption in the way
the  artist  intended,  just  as  a  description  of  the  work  would  have  to  include  an
acknowledgement  of the artist's  intentions  as a  means of best  interpreting the poem's
features. As in the case of Galaxy Quest, it could be necessary to consult intentions, rather
than trying to figure out, solely on the basis of works' qualities, whether they are encoded
or ironic, and so on.
In summary, I have argued against anti-intentionalism on the grounds that artistic
actions are intentional, that artistic actions need not be addressed to a particular agent, that
we  can  fail  to  understand  irony  without  knowledge  of  artists'  intentions,  and  that
information external to objects can help us understand them. In the next two sections, I
will  discuss  neo-Wittgensteinian  intentionalism,  which  is  based  on  a  different
metaphysics than externalist intentionalism, and, later, the problem that allusion poses for
both anti-intentionalism and neo-Wittgensteinian intentionalism.
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CHAPTER TWO
SECTION 3: Neo-Wittgensteinian Intentionalism
3.1 Neo-Wittgensteinian Intentionalism
Neo-Wittgensteinian intentionalism is thought by Carroll and Mothersill to constitute a
strong response to anti-intentionalist views.74 If “intention is identified as the purposive
structure of the work,” intentions are metaphysically inseparable from artworks, and so
criticism  of  the  intentions  artists  have  while  creating  art  is  focused  on  the  internal
properties of artworks.75 While to neo-Wittgensteinians the intentions that are of prime
importance to criticism are the purposes for which artworks are created – e.g., a movie
created for the purpose of telling a parable of the dangers of imposing morality on others
– purposive intentions are not the only kinds of intentions for which their view of the
metaphysical structure of works has ramifications. Each feature or quality is present in an
artwork because an artist performed certain actions, and we can understand the intentions
behind each action by examining or otherwise experiencing them. Though Wittgenstein's
views about mental events and perception influence this approach, aesthetic philosophers
point to the “locus classicus of this view of intention,” G. E. M. Anscombe's Intention, as
constituting its main foundation.76 In this section, I will attempt to disentangle the various
views associated with neo-Wittgensteinian intentionalism. While Carroll and Mothersill
regard Anscombe's view as neo-Wittgensteinian, Anscombe only argues for the view that
we can infer agents' intentions (seen as goals) from their actions. While Anscombe cites
74 Carroll, “Art, Intention, and Conversation,” p. 161; Mothersill, Beauty Restored, p. 20.
75 Carroll, “Art, Intention, and Conversation,” p. 161
76 Carroll, “Art, Intention, and Conversation” endnotes, in Beyond Aesthetics, p. 413. See also Mothersill,
Beauty  Restored,  p.  16;  Carroll,  “Art,  Intention,  and  Conversation,”  p.  161;  and  Colin  Lyas,
“Wittgensteinian Intentions,” in Intention and Interpretation, p. 140.
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Wittgenstein's  work  to  support  this,  Wittgenstein  seems  to  endorse  the  view  that
intentions  reside  within  actions.  To  confuse  matters  further,  neo-Wittgensteinians  use
Wittgenstein's view to support their claim that intentions reside within works, and thus
that artists' intentions can be determined through the close scrutiny of works, which are
themselves the products of artists' actions. As I will show, it is a mistake to attribute the
views of Wittgenstein or the neo-Wittgensteinians to Anscombe.
3.2 Anscombe's View
Anscombe's view of intention, inspired by Wittgenstein's philosophy, is a reaction against
the view that “a man's intended action is only described by describing his  objective.”77
She argues that since, “roughly speaking, a man intends to do what he does,” we can
describe intentional  actions  as the series of actions that  (in a  cascading means-to-end
way) support the achievement or failure of the intention (i.e., the objective) for acting.78
Therefore, by observing agents' actions, we can infer the intentions agents have while
acting.79 Though we ought not to attribute to her the view that we  actually see agents'
intentions by watching their actions – for she admits there are cases in which “only the
man himself can say whether he had a certain intention or not” – she argues convincingly
that our descriptions “are further limited by this: he cannot profess not to have had the
intention of doing the thing that was a means to an end.”80 For example, if one intends to
get a hole-in-one in golf, one must also intend to swing the club.
77 G. E. M. Anscombe, Intention (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1963), p. 45. Original emphasis.
78 Anscombe, Intention, p. 45 (quotation), p. 86.
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid., p. 44.
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Anscombe  discusses  an  example  of  a  cat  stalking  a  bird  to  illustrate  how
describing events intentionally is just a different way of describing events: “the cat is
stalking a bird  in crouching and slinking along with its eye fixed on the bird and its
whiskers twitching....Why is the cat crouching and slinking like that?....It's stalking that
bird.”81 This example displays her use of intention in the purposive sense: the intention of
the action is to catch the bird, while the intentions engaged in the service of achieving that
action are to crouch, slink,  and so on. The performance of these intentions  in lead to
achieving the intention of catching the bird.82
This way of describing actions does not necessarily imply that intentions are a part
of  actions.  Nothing in  Anscombe's  example shows that  we are  actually observing an
intention. We infer what the intention of the cat is by perceiving the action, even if the
evidence supporting that inference is formed by our minds into a kind of unconscious
argument, of which we are consciously aware only of the conclusion that the cat wants to
catch the bird.83 If people who never saw any cats or stalking actions before came upon a
cat stalking its prey, it is likely that they wouldn't see the action the same way that we do.
Or, if the cat were trained to stalk birds and then halt just when it looks like it will catch
them – for a movie or something similar – our inferences about the cat’s actions would
lead us to the wrong conclusion if we didn’t know about this training. While Anscombe's
concept of describing actions as intentional is accurate insofar as we generally reason this
way  in  everyday  life,  it  does  not  damage  the  credibility  of  the  distinction  between
intentions  and  actions.  She  does  not  affirm  that  we  can  accurately  assume  from
81 Ibid., p. 86.
82 Ibid., pp. 45-47.
83 Lyas, “Wittgensteinian Intentions,” p. 146.
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observation what private intentions are in all cases, which has ramifications for the neo-
Wittgensteinian intentionalism inspired by her work. Intentional descriptions of events are
even less likely to be true in the case of art-actions, since what we often find enjoyable
about  artworks  are  those  features  that  subvert  conventions  or  are  ambiguous.
Shakespeare's  Hamlet would be rendered far less enjoyable if Hamlet's intentions were
obvious in every word he speaks and action he performs.
Anscombe poses what seems to be a problem when she suggests, “if there are two
knowledges – one by observation, the other in intention – then it looks as if there must be
two objects of knowledge; but if one says the objects are the same, one looks hopelessly
for the different mode of contemplative knowledge in acting, as if there were a very queer
and special sort of seeing eye in the middle of acting.”84 But this is less problematic than
she appears to believe. There are, of course, two objects of knowledge, namely, intentions
and actions. Even non-purposive effective intentions cannot be the same as the actions
produced by them, for it would be absurd to say that a dancer's action of twirling around
in a counter-clockwise fashion is an intention. We see it, it is there, it is an action, but the
intention, however obvious, is a private mental event, which is either an electrical signal
in the brain, a thought in the mind of the dancer, or some combination of the two.85
Linguistically, she raised her hand is a kind of shorthand for she had the effective
intention  to  raise  her  hand,  and her  hand rose  as  a  result  of  her  brain  sending an
electrical signal that made her arm muscles move.86 But the former does not imply that
84 Anscombe, Intention, p.57.
85 Lyas, “Wittgensteinian Intentions,” p. 133, quoting Wimsatt. Lyas’s discussion of effective intentions is
helpful to my view. To refine my example further, if the dancer does not perform the twirl to achieve a
goal, it is not a purposive action.
86 See Ibid., p. 146, where Lyas explores a similar idea.
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the intention and action are the same. We can describe  why she raised her hand in the
latter way, but the effective intention is just what we mean by an intention that caused
something we see. Since we can be unaware of how our movements appear to others,
since  these  movements  can  be  involuntary,  and  since  effective  intentions  are  not
necessarily one and the same with intentions  in  acting, effective intentions are different
from the perceivable movements of the body.
A critic of this line of reasoning might respond that if by intentions in Anscombe
means effective intentions, and if the only intentions that count as effective are those that
are executed in the service of achieving a goal (not in the purposive sense), we do in fact
see  what  agents  intend  when  they  act  toward  something,  just  not  necessarily  in  the
purposive sense. But if this is so, we will have problems identifying which actions are
intended  in  the  effective  sense,  because  we  can  misinterpret  involuntary  actions  as
voluntary,  for instance,  accidental  taps  on a  shoulder  that  result  from a cold person's
shivering as fervent attention-seeking, stutters as inventive speech patterns, and so on. If
we go so far as to say that these are non-intentional, but effective, the distinction between
effective  actions  and  the  movements  of  corpses  becomes  moot.  Accordingly,  this
hypothetical critic would not understand Anscombe's argument adequately.
She raised her hand is not shorthand for she raised (intended to raise) her hand.
The intention and action are separate, as implied by the “and” in the longer version of the
sentence on the previous page. Intentions can fail to be achieved, whether due to a brain
aneurysm or a sudden change of heart, though she raised her hand unconsciously would
imply that it was an unintentional body movement.
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3.3 Lyas's View
In his paper “Wittgensteinian Intentions,” Colin Lyas argues that knowledge of agents'
intentions is relevant to understanding their actions, and that when an action or its result is
determinate, it is because an agent intended it to be so.87 While some of his objections to
anti-intentionalism align with my own, his claim that an intention can “manifest itself in
actions and words, and...can determine at least part of the proper description of those
actions and words” poses problems for externalist intentionalism.88 If intentions are parts
of works of art, even if they only exist in non-ambiguous parts of works, this entails that
efforts to consult artists' reports of intentions to determine what their artworks mean focus
on the  wrong object.89 Lyas's  view that  intention  and action  (including  any resulting
artwork) are not linked in a cause-and-effect way is inspired by Wittgenstein's idea that
minds are viewable “directly in bodies,” which I take to be the central  claim of neo-
Wittgensteinian  intentionalists.90 If,  following  from Lyas's  argument,  artworks  can  be
descriptively self-sufficient – that is, if we cannot rely on external information to gain
knowledge about artworks – and if, as he suggests, only those intentions that have been
realized in works are part of works, there is no reason to describe properties of artworks
as  intentional,  and so intentionalism is  unnecessary.91 Accordingly,  since the  focus  of
criticism is  the  particular  work in  question,  when it  is  obvious  what  the  work or  its
features mean, critics will not need to consult artists' intentions, even if those intentions
reside in  the work.  And because only successful  unambiguous intentions  are  parts  of
87 Ibid., p. 149, passim
88 Ibid., p. 148.
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid., p. 139, p. 138.
91 Ibid., p. 149.
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artworks, critics need not make use of authors' external reports of their intentions in order
to  resolve  ambiguities  about  a  work.  Essentially,  Lyas's  neo-Wittgensteinian
intentionalism reduces the role of intention to a redundant informational property. Let us
consider some objections to this oddly anti-intentionalist intentionalism.
If, as Lyas argues, intention and action are not always or entirely independently
knowable, this does not entail that there is no separation between them.92 We might only
be able to make sense of some actions by examining the intentions their agents had while
performing them, but it is not accurate to say that we need knowledge of actions to make
sense of intentions. I can intend to bring about private mental events, such as thinking
about a lamp, or imagining the successful performance of an action, yet these intentions
do not have publicly available counterparts. In addition, I can intend to achieve many
goals  and  perform  many  actions,  while  failing  to  realize  or  perform  them.  These
intentions, Lyas would concede, are not always apparent in actions, but that concession
undermines  the  supposed  link  between  actions  and  intentions.93 If  actions  require
intentions  in  order  to  explain  them,  and  if  we  can  confirm  those  intentions  by  the
examination of the actions themselves, it is unclear why we need to explain intentions as
parts of actions at all. And if the only way we know that actions display intentions is that
the  actions  are  determinate,  insofar  as  they  result  in  a  certain  outcome  –  because
intentions  and  actions  are  not  independently  knowable  –  it  is  entirely  possible  that
92 Ibid., p. 141.
93 Lyas, “Wittgensteinian Intentions,” p. 147.
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intentions  are  not  parts  of  actions,  but  rather  just  a  redundant  way  of  referring  to
determinate actions.94
Further,  if  unsuccessful intentions  can  be  perceived  within  artworks,  as  Lyas
seems to suggest, this means that actual intentions can be parts of artworks even though
they inspire the actions that create the artworks that contain them.95 It is unclear whether
intentions split into two or three, or move from a mind to an action to an object, which,
given the non-physical nature of intentions, sounds absurd. If intentions are perceivable in
artworks, the question remains whether they are to be found in physical form, or as a non-
physical quality of a work that, once examined closely, makes an impression on one's
mind. Since this theory, however interesting, is extraordinarily unlikely, it remains to be
seen how intentions can be perceived in actions, unless in a way that does not involve
direct perception. If, contrary to this interpretation, Lyas and Wittgenstein do not view
intentions as “directly” viewable in actions, and mean to say instead that our assumptions
of intent based on the physical qualities of actions and artworks  can often be correct, a
more charitable definition of the neo-Wittgensteinian view is warranted.96
94 While I am merging Lyas's discussions of actions and intentions with utterances and intentions here, it
is clear that uttering something is an action.
95 Lyas, “Wittgensteinian Intentions,” p. 134.
96 Ibid.,  p.  138.  In  spite  of  the  interpretation  I  offer  above of  Lyas's  view,  he  does  cite Anscombe's
Intention when he says that an animal “can, in its behaviour, give us evidence only on the basis of which
to ascribe intentions to it” (Ibid., p. 140). This might suggest a different interpretation of his paper. For a
vastly different argument reaching the same conclusion as my interpretation of Lyas's view, see G. L.
Hagberg,  Art as Language: Wittgenstein, Meaning, and Aesthetic Theory (Ithaca and London: Cornell
University Press, 1995). In chapters four and five of his book, Hagberg argues that intentions are not
mental images that correspond exactly to the works that result from them, so that the idea that mental
images cause works is wrong, which means that intentions exist within works as “embedded customs”
(p. 98).  His argument is  unpersuasive because he conflates  exact mental  images with  vague mental
images. It is of course absurd to claim that all works exist as exact mental images in the minds of their
artists before they are created, but this doesn't prove that intentions (as mental images) are unnecessary
for creating art. Even improvisational musicians have vague ideas as to which notes to play next during
a song, and the creation of each new note necessitates some memory of what came before (chords, note
patterns, etc.), as well as the sonic mental image of which note will come next. What notes one plays
next can depend upon limitations of the medium and the tools one uses, but it is the artist's role to deal
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3.4 Neo-Wittgensteinian Intentionalism: An Interpretation, and Objections
To give neo-Wittgensteinian intentionalism its full due, perhaps what proponents of this
view have in mind is that, since we describe certain events as intentional actions, and
since we can often see evidence of what intentions people have by observing intentional
actions, describing intentional actions when we are essentially certain of their intentions
is the same as describing the intentions the agents performing those actions have when
they act. This being so, since we can see the physical features of artworks, and since those
features  are  present  because  of  intentional  actions,  describing  artworks  when  we are
essentially certain of their meaning is the same as describing the intentions of the agents
who created the artworks.97
There are reasons to believe this is a correct view of the metaphysical structure of
artworks, which we might be better equipped to understand by considering the analogy of
the act of murder.98 Of course, we can describe an act of murder by saying  the agent
murdered the man, but we could also say, the agent struck the man, and the injury caused
by the strike killed the man.  These are two kinds of description that actually provide
with  these  limitations  in  order  to  express  an  emotion  or  idea  through  art.  Since  mental  images
(intentions) do not need to resemble exactly the works they anticipate, and can be vague and incomplete
during the creative process, Hagberg's objections are unpersuasive, and his argument does not prove that
intentions must then exist within works, as customs or otherwise.
97 This  hybrid  view  is  inspired  by  Ludwig  Wittgenstein,  Philosophical  Investigations,  trans.  G.E.M.
Anscombe  (Oxford:  Basil  Blackwell,  1974);  Anscombe's  Intention;  Carroll's  “Art,  Intention,  and
Conversation”;  Christoph  Lumer,  “How  to  Interpret  Human  Actions,”  in  Interpretation:  Ways  of
Thinking  about  the  Sciences  and  the  Arts,  eds.  Peter  K.  Machamer,  Gereon  Wolters  (Pittsburgh:
Pittsburgh  University  Press,  2010),  p.  136;  P.  R.  Bhat,  “Intention  in  Wittgenstein,”  in  Indian
Philosophical Quarterly,  Vol.  XX, No. 3 (July,  1993), online source:  unipune.ac.in; Alberto Arruda,
“Intention in Aesthetics,” in Papers of the 33rd International Wittgenstein Symposia, eds. E. Nemeth, R.
Heinrich, W. Pichler, online source: wittgensteinrepository.org, 2010; P. M. S. Hacker,  Themes in the
Philosophy of  Wittgenstein, revised edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press,  1986);  Lyas,  “Wittgensteinian
Intentions.”
98 Anscombe, Intention (passim.), and Lyas, “Wittgensteinian Intentions,” p. 141, where both cite murder
as examples to explain how they conceive of intention.
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different information. Describing an action as an act of murder implies the intention to
kill, whereas describing the act of striking someone does not. Since determining whether
an action is murder depends upon establishing that the agent intended to kill, there could
be other actions that depend upon such determinations. But since intentions are private,
and even agents' descriptions of actions are not always accurate, we often infer intention
from the actions performed by agents.99 This is not circular: we see the actions or results
of actions, determine for ourselves the evidence for or against an agent's having a certain
intention, and decide how to characterize the action based upon that determination. In
fact, this is how we can gain a proper picture of an action, because without this kind of
inference, intentional acts could only be understood by consulting those performing them,
unless the boundaries between others' minds and our own were to collapse. So then, this
version of neo-Wittgensteinian intentionalism supports  the idea that an artwork is  the
result  of an action (or actions),  and that  since that creative act  is  understood best by
reference to its agent's intentions, the resulting artwork is also understood best in light of
the same information.
While an interesting line of defence for intentionalism, however, this view is not
adequate, because it either requires a metaphysically dubious concept of intention in order
to work, or it confuses actions with the results of actions. I will deal with the former
possibility first. Carroll says that, for neo-Wittgensteinians, “intention is identified as the
purposive structure of the work.”100 On this view, something that displays the purpose for
which an artwork is  made belongs to that  artwork's  metaphysical  structure.  If  such a
99 Lyas,  “Wittgensteinian  Intentions,”  p.  141.  Lyas  demonstrates  this  by  discussing  an  example  of
questioning murderers about their intentions, and the likelihood that they would lie in order to avoid jail.
100 Carroll, “Art, Intention, and Conversation,” p. 161.
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structure exists, it is unclear how anyone who examines an artwork closely could ever be
confused about what it means, since this structure “regulates the way the artwork is.”101 If
this structure exists but is only noticeable when it is obvious to any observer that a given
intention has been realized in a work, the structure seems to have no function, and so we
ought to remove it from metaphysical accounts of art.102 If it exists and is noticeable, even
when intentions are not successfully represented in a given work, then, paradoxically, we
can perceive, by inspection of the work's physical features, metaphysical qualities that are
not dependent on the physical features we inspect.
The deeper problem for neo-Wittgensteinian intentionalism concerns the way we
describe  actions  and  their  results.  Just  as  neo-Wittgensteinians  argue  for  describing
actions intentionally, they argue for describing artworks intentionally, despite the fact that
artworks are the  results of actions and not  actions themselves. While one could create
something intended to be an artwork, if that artwork consists only of dents on a wall, it is
unlikely that anyone without foreknowledge of one's actions will know that the dents are
actually  the  result  of  intentional  aesthetic  actions,  let  alone  that  they  constitute  an
artwork. The dents themselves cannot confirm their status of being features of an artwork.
Likewise, we might say that an agent's killing a person results in that person being dead.
Even if the intention does not cause the action, the intention is only relevant to the action
and not the dead body. Finding out why a person died by another's hand concerns the
action; the person's status as dead is only the result of the action.  Perhaps the reason
101 Ibid.
102 If the structural content of art is not as sparse as my view suggests, it would not mean that my entire
point  is  lost,  but  it  would  require  that  defences  of  intentionalism rely  on  information  that  seems
impossible to attain.
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behind some conflicting  descriptions  of  events  is  that  there  are  two entirely separate
objects of description, namely, actions and results.
A neo-Wittgensteinian  might  object  that,  even  in  the  case  of  murder,  we  can
understand the definition of the result,  a dead man, as incomplete without reference to
what kind of  dead we mean: murdered, died of natural causes, etc. But the result of an
action is not that the metaphysical state of someone's body or mind switches from not
murdered to  murdered, but simply that it causes someone's state to switch from alive to
dead.103 The result is not that murder has occurred, but that, since murder occurred, a man
is dead.  What caused his death? The action.  What is the result of the action? A man's
being dead. Despite our common use of the term murder without reference to agents who
cause murder (e.g., a murder has happened),  it  is the actions of those agents that we
criticize,  and  in  turn  the  agents  and  their  intentions,  not  their  results.104 A practical
example of this is that we consider murder to be worse than manslaughter even though
both actions result in a person's being dead. This being so, it is not accurate to say that we
actually criticize an artwork for failing in some way; our criticism is really of the artist
who created the artwork, for failing to create a better result.105 This is supported by the
fact  that  we  do  not  get  mad  at  computers  for  creating  bad  poetry,  nor  do  we  feel
103 Anscombe,  Intention,  pp.  28-29.  If  bodies  or  minds  were  able  to  switch  from  not  murdered to
murdered, it would require some extra feature that attaches to results of actions, which Anscombe here
shows does not exist.
104 Noël Carroll, On Criticism, p. 49. To elaborate further, we criticize someone for taking a life away, not
the dead body for being dead. It's not that the body itself contains something bad. Rather, the action was
bad because it caused the person to no longer exist. We may say that the result is bad, but what we mean
by this is that the result is unpleasant to us, and the action that brought about the result was either
performed for a bad reason, or was part of a series of unfortunate or unlucky actions. While morality
concerns actions, the results of actions cannot be evaluated in this way.
105 Lyas, “Wittgensteinian Intentions,” p. 134, where a similar idea is discussed.
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disappointed  by  art  created  by  young  children.106 The  artist,  and  in  some  cases
background  information  about  the  artist,  is  important  to  our  critical  evaluations  of
artworks, but anger or disappointment about artworks are reactions to the wrong objects.
3.5 Neo-Wittgensteinian Anti-Intentionalism and the Aim of Explanatory Questions
Ultimately, while neo-Wittgensteinian intentionalists aim to support intentionalism, they
actually defend a kind  of  anti-intentionalism,  since  they focus  on the  examination  of
works themselves as the way to understand the purposes for which works were created.
But the question why was this work created? cannot receive an answer from a work. Such
a question  concerns  its  artist's  motivations,  not  what  the  work's  features  are.  Stanley
Cavell identifies artists as the proper focus of questions regarding purposive intentions,
but does not deny that these intentions are relevant to understanding works, noting that
“intending to  do something is  internally related to wanting something to happen, and
discovering an intention is a way of discovering an explanation.”107 In many cases, this
information could help us understand how best to understand or appreciate works, but as
Cavell suggests, a question about  why a work has certain features is artist-focused, and
different than a work-focused question about what it means that some quality of a work is
a certain way.108 A purposive intention to create a work of art is not an intention  that a
106 Scott Weems,  Ha!: The Science of When We Laugh and Why  (New York, New York: Basic Books,
2014), p. 122. Weems discusses a computer program that generates poems, and provides an example of
one: “Holy cow. A carton of milk. Seeking a church.”
107 Stanley Cavell, “A Matter of Meaning It,” in Must We Mean What We Say? A Book of Essays (London:
Cambridge University Press, 1969). On p. 235, Cavell cites Anscombe for this idea.
108 Cavell, “Music Discomposed,” in  Must We Mean What We Say?,  where Cavell says that “Nothing
could be commoner among critics of art than to ask why the thing is as it is, and characteristically to put
this question, for example, in the form 'Why does Shakespeare follow the murder of Duncan with a
scene which begins with the sound of knocking?', or 'Why does Beethoven put in a bar of rest in the last
line of the fourth Bagatelle (Op. 126)?' The best critic is the one who knows best where to ask this
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work of art exists, but an intention about why a work is the way it is. Through the features
of a  work,  which act  as symbols for users  of  aesthetic  languages of certain kinds  or
genres, that work can suggest or reflect the reason for which it was created, but cannot
actually  contain  it.  This  problem  prevents  neo-Wittgensteinian  intentionalism  from
adequately supporting anti-intentionalism, despite seeming to argue in favour of a form of
it.
In summary, I have shown that Anscombe's view of intention as something we can
often  infer  from  action  is  actually  closer  to  externalist  intentionalism  than  neo-
Wittgensteinian  intentionalism;  I  have  argued  against  the  neo-Wittgensteinian
intentionalist idea that intentions are directly viewable within works, on the grounds that
intentions are unnecessary if only those that are successfully realized are perceivable in
works, and that it is unclear how unsuccessful intentions could transfer to or be created in
works that don't display corresponding features; I have discussed a more nuanced view of
neo-Wittgensteinian intentionalism, which I believe confuses the intentions on the basis
of which agents act with the works that result from those actions; and I have argued that
were the neo-Wittgensteinian concept of intentions as internal properties of works correct,
it would actually support anti-intentionalism.
question, and how to get an answer...” (p. 182). Cavell's questions here are author-focused, even if the
impetus to find the answers is due to enjoyment or understanding of the work. They are not questions
about the meaning of the works of art, but about the artist's motivation for making the work appear so. A
simple answer why is this feature x could be answered with the artist wanted it to be so, but this would
not concern what the feature means.
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SECTION 4: ALLUSION
4.1 Allusion, Framing, and Intention
Our perception of works frames them. We can set about framing a work by putting it in a
gallery, focusing light on it, or physically installing a frame to surround it, yet we also use
what we know of its author's intentions and history to contextualize what we perceive. It
is impossible to see a work for exactly what it is, since the nature of our perception is
influenced  by  our  concepts  and  constrained  by  our  abilities  to  perceive,  our  brains'
compression of sensory information, and our limited ability to retain information. Our
senses require us either to perceive the context in which a work appears or to block it out
intentionally.  Even an unconscious focus on a specific feature of a work is a form of
framing. For example,  my focusing on the yellowed parts  of a Goya painting doesn't
make  the  rest  of  the  painting  actually  disappear,  but  nonetheless  emphasizes  certain
elements while de-emphasizing others. The use of allusion in art is one way artists can
attempt to influence our framing of their works, by recalling and invoking other works, or
implying an adherence to, or subversion of, cultural rules or genre constraints.
In this section, through discussion of what allusion is and how it functions, I will
show that the concept of allusion is compatible with externalist intentionalism, and even
seems to support  it  against  potential  objections.  I  will  start  with a  dictionary-derived
definition of allusion which will provide the basis upon which I will attempt to refine the
concept further, largely through an examination of other contributions to the subject. I
will discuss Göran Hermeren's and Stephanie Ross's separate accounts of allusion, and,
arriving at a working definition informed by their work, will consider implications that an
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interpretation of Beardsley's view has for intentionalism. I will work toward the view that
allusions require an agent to perform the act of alluding.
4.2 What is Allusion? A Definition, and Examples
The  Canadian  Oxford  Dictionary defines  “allusion”  as  “a  reference,  esp.  a  covert,
passing, or indirect one,” and “reference,” in turn, as “a direction of attention to a book or
passage of a book.”109 If we modify the end of the latter of these definitions to “an object
or some property of an object,” we approach a useful definition of allusion that will prove
relevant to our discussion. The working definition we can derive from these dictionary
entries is that an allusion is an indirect direction of attention to an object or some feature
of an object.  Here, the term “object” includes anything that can be an object in speech,
and so is not limited to purely physical objects. Shifting the focus away from text, book,
or artwork is  useful,  because one can allude to  world events,  which are not artworks
created by humans. On the off-chance that there are problems introduced by alluding to
non-art objects, we can amend this definition to read, an indirect direction of attention to
an artwork or some feature of an artwork. It is important to note that this definition does
not imply that agency is needed for allusion, nor does it imply that allusions are best
discovered or understood by looking for artists' intentions.110
109 The  Canadian  Oxford  Dictionary,  ed.  Katherine  Barber  (Toronto,  Oxford,  New  York:  Oxford
University Press, 1998). The definition of  reference I give is 2a, because 1a “an allusion” would be
circular, and 1b “a relation or correspondence” could entail that “reference” means any kind of relation
or correspondence, including those relations and correspondences which are not created by the act of
referring. Milk is white, but is not a reference to white wallpaper, and neither is Esi Edugyan's  Half-
Blood Blues a reference to J.K. Rowling's  Harry Potter and the Half-Blood Prince. References must
refer, which is in most cases to, first, “describe,” second, “represent,” or third, “direct (someone) to a
person or thing for help, information, advice, etc.”
110 Just as we can perceive natural features of the world as signs that direct our attention to other such
features, we can perceive features of works as signs that direct us to other features or works. See Section
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A literary  example  of  allusion  is  the  use  of  phrasing  and  imagery  similar  to
Shakespeare's  play  Hamlet in  T.  S.  Eliot's  poem “The Hollow Men.”111 Oliver  Tearle
argues  convincingly  that  in  Eliot's  poem,  “'The  eyes  [that]  are  not  here'  (line  91),
'Sightless' men (91), 'a dead man’s hand' (90), and 'Eyes I dare not meet in dreams' (89)”
are allusions to Hamlet's line “Eyes without feeling, feeling without sight, / Ears without
hands or eyes, smelling sans all” in Shakespeare's play.112 Tearle provides further evidence
that the poem in part alludes to Hamlet, noting that “Shape without form, shade without
colour,  /  Paralysed  force,  gesture  without  motion;  (11-12)”  bears  an  unmistakable
similarity to the former Shakespearean lines.113 These similarities in tone, rhythm, subject
matter, alliteration, and the actual words used all lend credence to the view that they are
allusions to Hamlet, and this implies that the poem, in part or in whole, is an allusion to
Hamlet or its title character.114 That Eliot wrote an analysis of Hamlet with specific focus
on scenes involving Gertrude (such as the quotation above) further suggests that Eliot was
aware  enough of  Hamlet's  words  and subject  matter  to  intend “The Hollow Men” to
allude to Hamlet.115
In film, Hal Ashby's Being There contains a striking allusion to Stanley Kubrick's
2001:  A  Space  Odyssey.116 In  Kubrick's  film,  Richard  Strauss's  song  “Also  Sprach
Zarathustra” is used audibly as a kind of indicator of evolution or significant change,
4.4 of this thesis for further discussion of the former implication.
111 Oliver Tearle, "Hamlet and T. S. Eliot's The Hollow Men" in The Explicator, Vol. 70, No. 2 (Routledge /
Taylor & Francis Group, online source: www.tandfonline.com/loi/vexp20, 2012), pp. 92-95.
112 T. S. Eliot and William Shakespeare, as quoted by Tearle, "Hamlet and T. S. Eliot's The Hollow Men,"
p. 92. All quotations.
113 T. S. Eliot, as quoted by Tearle, "Hamlet and T. S. Eliot's The Hollow Men," p. 92.
114 Tearle, "Hamlet and T. S. Eliot's The Hollow Men," passim.
115 Ibid., pp. 94-95.
116 Hal Ashby (dir.), Being There (Lorimar Productions: United Artists, 1979, film); Stanley Kubrick (dir.),
2001: a Space Odyssey (Stanley Kubrick Productions: Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 1968, film).
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appearing  in  key  moments,  like  an  ape's  realization  that  a  bone  can  be  used  as  a
weapon.117 In Being There, Chance the gardener emerges for the first time into the world
outside his former home's walls, and during his initial exploration of these surroundings,
Eumir Deodato's funk arrangement of "Also Sprach Zarathustra” plays. Through this use,
Ashby's  film  alludes  to  the  momentous  nature  of  the  changes  2001's  characters
experience, in order to emphasize just how significant Chance's change of scenery is. It is
a tongue-in-cheek allusion as well, because while the song indicates Chance's subjective
evolutionary  moment,  its  new  arrangement  simultaneously  emphasizes  the  mundane
impoverished urban environment surrounding Chance's experience, and ordinary people
oblivious to his momentous change.
Finally,  Jared  Baxter  argues  that  Van  Gogh's  Café  Terrace  at  Night contains
allusions to Da Vinci's The Last Supper, or similar paintings of that Biblical event.118 With
regard to the painting's  features,  Baxter  argues that  because there are  a dozen central
figures, a window that resembles a cross behind a server dressed in white, a lamp glowing
near the server's head, what appears to be a small cross on the server's clothes, a shadowy
Judas-like figure in  a doorway,  and a  small  cross of orange light in the distance,  the
painting is likely an allusion to  The Last Supper.119 But this analysis ignores some key
compositional features of Van Gogh's painting. While there are twelve central figures, one
of them is the server, who is the supposed Christ figure; if we expand our interpretation of
117 Strauss's song is listed in the film as "Thus Spoke Zarathustra."
118 Todd Van Luling, "Vincent Van Gogh May Have Hidden 'The Last Supper' Within One of His Most
Famous Paintings," in  The Huffington Post, (published online,  June 3, 2015, updated June 12, 2017,
retrieved  December  8  2018:  www.huffingtonpost.ca/entry/van-gogh-last-supper_n_6753294).  Van
Luling credits Baxter with this theory throughout the article.
119 Jared Baxter, as summarized by Todd Van Luling,  "Vincent Van Gogh May Have Hidden 'The Last
Supper' Within One of His Most Famous Paintings."
55 The Resurrection of the Author    Daniel Trainor-McKinnon
the central figures to include two additional somewhat catlike golden-hued figures sitting
at  a  table,  this  leaves  us  with  thirteen  figures,  including  the  supposed  Judas  in  the
doorway; a window with four panes is not something so unusual as to warrant a reference
to Christianity; the lamp is not placed directly above the server, but is instead positioned
above a couple at a table next to her; and the server is a woman, which would seem to be
at odds with the Christian and Papal doctrine that Jesus was a man.120 With regard to the
artist's intentions, Baxter cites a letter Vincent Van Gogh wrote to his brother Theo Van
Gogh,  about  a  “tremendous  need  ...  for  religion,”  written  about  two  weeks  after  the
painting's completion.121 But the supposed implications of this letter seem at odds with
one Vincent wrote to his sister Wilhelmina Van Gogh about the painting, in which he
describes “enormously enjoy[ing] painting on the spot at night,” and says “the beginning
of [Guy de Maupassant's]  Bel-ami is precisely the description of a starry night in Paris,
with  the  lighted  cafés  of  the  boulevard  ...  something  like  the  same subject  that  I’ve
painted just now”.122 From this evidence, it does not appear that Van Gogh intended to
allude to  The Last Supper.  However, we have yet to determine what relevance artists'
intentions have to allusions.
4.3 What is Allusion? Göran Hermeren's View
In his “Allusions and Intentions,” Göran Hermeren argues that any relation of allusion
between artworks must be bound by three constraints:
120 Vincent Van Gogh,  Café Terrace at Night, 1888 (painting). Wikipedia.org, “Café Terrace at Night,”
online source: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Café_Terrace_at_Night.
121 Van Gogh, as quoted in Todd Van Luling's  "Vincent Van Gogh May Have Hidden 'The Last Supper'
Within One of His Most Famous Paintings;" Wikipedia.org, “Café Terrace at Night.”
122 Van Gogh, as quoted by Wikipedia.org, “Café Terrace at Night.” Both quotations.
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1. It is possible that an author intended to allude to something but failed.
2. It is possible that a work can contain an allusion even if nobody discovered the 
    allusion.
3. It is possible that a work can contain an allusion even if nobody read that text.123
These are reasonable guidelines for any definition of allusion. Especially critical to this
discussion is the first constraint: one can fail to make apparent what a feature of a work is
an allusion to, and so while that property can be apparent in a work of art, it need not
constitute  an  allusion,  even  if  there  were  an  intent  to  make the  property apparent.124
Hermeren's definition of the act of allusion, in what he calls “the weak sense,” requires
that  the  work  being  alluded  to  exists (the  existence  requirement), and  that  the  artist
intends to ensure that the work contains properties that the artist “believes will make those
familiar with the genre and tradition” think of the work being referred to  (the selected-
features requirement).125 Hermeren's weak definition of allusion is closer to our working
definition  than  his  stronger ones,  which  I  will  not  discuss,  except  to  say  that  they
constrain  the  concept  of  allusion  unnecessarily.  While  the  existence  requirement  is
obvious, we have to modify the selected-features requirement in order to proceed with a
view of allusion that is more compatible with our dictionary-derived working definition,
which will prompt, in turn, the first modification to our working definition.
For allusions ever to be successful, they require an intended audience that knows
both the object being referred to and the way the formal features of the referring work
123 Göran Hermeren, “Allusions and Intentions,” p. 208.
124 Ibid.,  p.  209,  where  Hermeren  says  as  much  while  discussing  authorism  (which  he  calls  “an
intentionalist approach”).
125 Ibid., p. 214.
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allude to that object. But successful allusion does not necessarily depend upon people
being familiar  with any genre  or  tradition.  Allusion  can  be very specific,  such as  an
allusion to a song that few people have heard, or to a word that would only be significant
to members of some highly-exclusive field of work. Given our definition, which does not
necessarily refer to peoples' actions at all, an allusion need not involve anyone but the
artist who intends to allude. But this exposes a flaw in our working definition. If allusions
were like secret codes only known to one person, there would be no truly accurate way of
distinguishing successful from unsuccessful allusions. Artists would have the final say
about whether their allusions are successful, which would render criticism of allusions
difficult at best. One could allude to anything in one's memory and conform to one's own
standards of success, even if no one else were capable of understanding which memory is
supposed to be referred to by the allusion. Perhaps an additional term, such as  private
allusion, should be used in such cases. For example, a painting containing a blue blotch
reminds its artist of a small hat she had when she was young, and she did in fact intend
the blotch to be an allusion to the hat while painting it, but she is the only one for whom
the features bring the hat to mind. Our concept of allusion cannot work this way, since
criticism requires shareable knowledge about artworks. Allusion, then, must be aimed at
informing at least one person or group of people other than the alluding artist, though it
need not refer to a genre, tradition, and so on. As Stephanie Ross observes, “allusion
cannot proceed through private atypical methods of association.”126 A successful allusion
must be understandable by the public,  even if  only a few members of the public can
126 Ross, “Art  and  Allusion,” p.  64.  Ross  refers  here  to  an  idea  about  subliminally  introducing  a
relationship between basic colours and shapes, and more complex paintings.
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understand. Accordingly, we can modify our working definition to an indirect direction of
attention to an object or some property of an object, not created by the person being
directed.   With  all  of  this  in  mind,  Hermeren's  selected-features  requirement  can  be
modified to convey the idea that the artist intends to make the work contain features that
will make audiences familiar with another work, genre, tradition, or reference think of the
work being referred to.127 This view is intentionalist, but does not imply that the artist
needs to have a specific or existing audience as the target of an allusive act.
4.4 What is Allusion? Stephanie Ross's View
Not only is Ross's conception of allusion also intentionalist, but she appears to endorse a
view  similar  to  externalist  intentionalism.  She  says  that  “one  artwork,  A,  alludes  to
another artwork, B, only if the artist of A (1) intended to refer to B, and (2) incorporated
into A an indirect reference to B,” but that “artworks allude, represent, express, depict,
etc., only as part of a larger symbol system.”128 This view marks the distinction between
an artwork alluding or expressing, and an artwork containing an allusion or expression.
While alluding is an action, which therefore requires some level of agency, a work does
not itself need the capacity to act in order to contain a symbol that we understand as a
reference to something. What makes this view compatible with our working definition is
that a direction of attention is not necessarily an action of directing. A direction in a work
is  a symbol, and although the symbol is created by the work's artist, the symbol, not the
127 See Hermeren, “Allusions and Intentions,” pp. 214-215, where he discusses a similar idea that he calls
the  “effect  requirement,”  though  that  requirement  focuses  on  audiences  understanding  what  artists
intend, rather than artists' intentions to make audiences understand.
128 Ross, “Art and Allusion,” p. 63 and pp. 69-70, endnote 2; respectively.
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action, is interpreted by audiences. The artist aims to use symbols that, if successfully
realized and properly interpreted, will cause audiences, in turn, to direct their attention in
a certain way. This does not entail that anything can be an allusion simply if an artist
intends it, for what an allusion refers to is not only “determined by the speaker's intent but
also by the content of his speech.”129 While Ross argues that “allusion is a speech-act,” it
is unclear whether she means the action of allusion or the allusive property of a work.130 If
allusion  were  just  a  speech-act,  the  only  relevant  feature  of  it  would  be  its  artist's
intention, which would make art an unnecessary encumbrance to understanding what its
artist means. But if there is a separate term we use for the group of features that constitute
an  allusion,  and  if  those  features  belong  to  the  work  as  a  kind  of  symbol  that  is
understandable only to those who know something about what its artist intended to refer
to, we can regard the speech-act as an act of creating an allusion, and the allusion as an
unchangeable feature (or collection of features) of a work that can be interpreted using a
symbol system.
Of course, an artwork containing a symbol (a feature or collection of features) that
is an allusion and an artwork containing a symbol of an allusion are two different things.
Examples of the latter could include features that inspire audiences to regard them as
allusions, which do not actually refer to anything, like a painting of an artist's studio with
many  framed  paintings  on  a  wall,  some  of  which  do  not  even  exist,  or  a  fictitious
quotation attributed to a non-existent author. While an allusion refers to something that
has existed at some point in time, a symbol of an allusion need not.
129 Ibid., p. 65.
130 Ibid.
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One might object that this view of allusion depends too heavily on what an artist
intends,  in order to  determine what  a  work or feature alludes to.  On Ross's  view, an
allusion can only refer to what its artist intends to refer to, and if it is an unsuccessful
allusion, it cannot allude at all. One might object that this view, as it applies to successful
allusion,  approaches a  kind of authorism. But for an allusion to  exist,  it  must  be the
product of an action. Since it is a symbol and lacks the agency to refer its audience to an
external object, it must be intended by an agent to be some way rather than another. A
successful allusion is really just a feature (or group of features) that can be interpreted by
audiences as referring to another work. It would be absurd to deny that works are created
by people,  since,  as Beardsley has  shown,  their  status  as works  depends upon artists
intending, to some degree, that the works will take on certain aesthetic features.131 What
we call allusion is, like art,  an idea that depends upon intentions, which, like units of
speech, can symbolize specific ideas or objects. This is not to say that the features that
constitute what we call an allusion actually have a specific meaning independent of what
we can understand of them by using aesthetic (symbolic) language. They do not contain
meaning, nor do they carry an intention.  But as we interpret symbols in art,  some as
allusions, we can understand which works are referents of allusions made by artists, in the
same way that we can infer some intentions artists have by examining their works.
Since artists determine what objects or properties allusions within works refer to,
consulting an artist about whether or what she intended to allude to would be relevant to
determining what an allusion's referent is, at least in cases where, first, information from
examinations of a work is difficult to obtain, and, second, she successfully intended an
131 Beardsley, “An Aesthetic Definition of Art,” p. 21. I discuss this above in section 1.4 of this thesis.
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allusion. That is, intentions, though external to works, are relevant to determining which
features  count  as  allusions,  and  what  works  an  allusion  refers  to.  In  the  case  of
unsuccessful attempts to allude, artists' reports of intention could still be useful, as they
could  limit  possible  attributions  of  allusion  in  certain  circumstances.  Like  shadows
constrained  by the  shapes  that  cast  them,  allusions  in  works  are  constrained  by the
intentions  of  the artists  who create  them: they are as  lacking in intention as  people's
shadows, are further constrained by external rules as shadows are by light,  and often
remain ill-defined without our knowing something of their sources. With the preceding
discussions in mind, we can amend our working definition one final time to a feature (or
group of features) that is intended to act as an indirect direction of attention to an object
or some property of an object, not created by the person being directed.
4.5 Allusion and Beardsley's View
According to Beardsley's considered view, since our aim is to understand the worthiness
of works, to consult artists about what their works mean is to admit that some quality or
meaning remains unclear in those works, and that this lack of clarity negatively affects
our correct understanding of the worth of the work. That is, the work of art or a portion of
it does not work, in the sense of its being enjoyable or accomplished as an instance of its
genre or style.132 This is a weaker position than Wimsatt and Beardsley's considered view,
and Barthes's view, but it challenges the critical requirement of referring to artists' reports
of intention with regard to allusion.
132 Beardsley, “The Authority of the Text,” pp.24-25.
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An objection to Beardsley's considered view is that critics can fail to detect certain
features of artworks, like references, allusions, and irony. While the ability of an audience
to detect these increases the likelihood of their enjoyment and understanding of a work, if
critics  are  ignorant  of  them,  artists'  reports  of  intention  can  provide  the  necessary
information, since they tend to know what external information is necessary for adequate
appreciation  of  these  features.  Though  it  may  be  unnecessary  to  identify  an  artist's
intentions in many cases, if prominent critics do not have enough information to deepen
their interpretations of a certain work, and its artist does, there is no reason that references
to reports of intention should be taken as evidence that a work is lacking or fails to work
in some sense. While Beardsley sees it as the role of the critic to find information relevant
to appreciating works properly, it is unclear why this search should be limited to critics.133
If critics don't know that the sound-sample in “Jerry Was a Race Car Driver” by
the musical group Primus is not a car's engine and a driver speaking, but actually the
sound of a chainsaw humming and the voice of the villain Leatherface from the horror
movie  Texas  Chainsaw  Massacre,  their  interpretation  of  the  song  will  lack  full
understanding of the dark tone the song's other sonic qualities suggest, and they might
interpret it as lightly comic.134 Likewise, the enjoyment of James Joyce's Finnegans Wake
hinges on understanding the meaning of its many repetitive puns and composite words,
like the 100-character “bababadalgharaghtakamminarronnkonnbronntonnerronntuonnthun
133 Ibid., p.34.
134 Primus, “Jerry Was a Race Car Driver,” from Sailing the Seas of Cheese (Interscope Records, 1991,
CD). Hooper,  Tobe (dir.),  The Texas Chainsaw Massacre (Vortex: Bryanston Distributing Company,
1974,  film). In this case, Primus is referring to the themes of the movie (gore and horror caused by
people), rather than its villain directly. Jerry dies in an extreme car crash near the end of the song, and
this is evidence that Primus is equating careless speeding or stunting with the gore and horror of murder.
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ntrovarrhounawnskawntoohoohoordenenthurnuk!” used to signify and perhaps imitate the
sound of thunder, though a proper understanding of the book would require knowledge of
a  multiplicity  of  references,  spanning  more  than  a  dozen  languages,  the  Bible,  Irish
geography and history, linguistics, and the history of human civilization, among others.135
Of course, there are cases in which further information could negatively affect
interpretations,  or  not  serve  to  change  much  at  all  about  whether  a  work  succeeds
aesthetically. In the case of the former, one could imagine a situation in which knowing
that a feature of a work refers to something derogatory or offensive would sour one's
opinion of the work. In the latter case, my opinion of Swedish electroacoustic artist Rune
Lindblad's opus “Till Zakynthos” (“To Zakynthos”) was originally quite positive. It is
pensive and darkly beautiful, with an undeniable longing melancholy and deep emotional
and sonic complexity. After I spent a decade wondering what the spoken words in the
middle  of  the  song were,  a  friend (with  a  lot  of  effort)  discovered  that  they were a
recitation of Ugo Foscolo's 1803 poem “A Zacinto” (“To Zakynthos”), written in Italian,
about  his  own exile  from his island homeland.  While  knowledge of what  the poem's
words mean, in translation, has compelled me to amend my initial interpretation that the
song's noises and tones evoke 1960s squalor and extraterrestrial fantasy, and to associate
135 James  Joyce,  Finnegans  Wake (Ware,  Hertfordshire:  Wordsworth  Editions  Limited,  2012),  p.  3.
According to the Finnegans Wake fan website, finwake.com, the 100-character word contains fragments
and phonetic combinations of Hindustani, Finnish, French, Italian, Portuguese, Swedish, Danish, and
Gael words for thunder, among others. Without the knowledge that there is an intention behind the novel
and words like this in it, one would likely think that something had gone horribly wrong at the printing
press. A laconic description of Finnegans Wake is that it is a “vast story of a symbolic Irishman's cosmic
dream [which]  develops  by enormous  reverberating  puns  a  continuous  expansion  of  meaning,  the
elements  in  the  puns  deriving from every conceivable  source  in  history,  literature,  mythology,  and
Joyce's  personal experience....  Finnegans Wake aims to embrace all  of human history.”  The Norton
Anthology  of  English  Literature,  Eighth  Edition,  The  Major  Authors,  Volume  B,  gen.  ed.  Stephen
Greenblatt, founding ed. emeritus M.H. Abrams (New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company,
2006), p. 2502.
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them, instead,  with oceanic scenes  and the lapping and crashing of waves,  the poem
displays qualities that the song has, being darkly beautiful, longingly melancholic, and
complex.  By alluding  to  the  poem,  the  song  can  be  recognized  as  referring  both  to
Foscolo's  exile  specifically  and  the  concept  of  exile  generally  from  an  emotional
standpoint.  Because  the  song  and  the  poem  display  similar  qualities,  the  further
knowledge of the poem's  meaning hasn't  changed for me the fact  that  the song “Till
Zakynthos”  works,  even  though  it  provides  a  new layer  of  meaning  for  listeners  to
appreciate.136
One could say that in increasingly obscure cases of allusion, reference, and so on,
such a work will only appear worthwhile to a small group of people, but this is true of
works  in  many different  genres  and styles  of art.  A proper  reading of a  poem, song,
movie, etc. might reflect understanding of the allusion, reference, or irony that is intended
without consulting the work's artist.  But references to obscure external objects  do not
have to be accessible to large groups of people. Perhaps an allusion is successful if one
can understand it, provided one knows anything the artist knows that isn't just a private
memory. Intentions, then, can be relevant to understanding allusions, and can even be
relevant to assessing the aesthetic worth of a work, but the intention to allude neither
entails successful allusion, nor a change in a work's perceived worth.
In summary, I have examined what allusion is, demonstrating that the success of
an allusion depends upon its being able to be understood by people other than its artist. I
136 Rune Lindblad, “Till Zakynthos (Op. 205),” from An Anthology of Noise and Electronic Music #3 (Sub
Rosa  Label,  2017).  Ugo  Foscolo,  “A  Zacinto”  (written  in  1803),  online  source:
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A_Zacinto.  It  could be argued that  a direct  quotation is not a reference, but I
contend that the quotation's use in “Till Zakynthos” is also used to refer to Foscolo's exile.
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have argued that intentions, if successful, necessarily determine what an allusion refers to,
and  have  shown  that  this  is  compatible  with  the  view  that  artists'  reports  of  their
intentions in alluding can aid in determining the worth of works.
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SECTION 5: The Resurrection of the Author: Implications for Criticism
5.1 Externalist Intentionalism Summarized, and Further Problems
In  light  of  the  preceding,  externalist  intentionalism seems  to  be  the  best  theory  for
understanding aesthetic meaning that criticism could utilize. While it is an endorsement of
intentionalism,  it  is  supported  by  the  definition  of  art's  metaphysics  that  many anti-
intentionalists  use  to  show,  often  implicitly,  that  the  neo-Wittgensteinian  view  of
intentions  as  properties  embodied  in  works  is  wrong.  It  also  complements  the  most
plausible definition of allusion, without denying that artists' intentions are necessary for
the existence of allusions. For an externalist intentionalist, it is permissible, though not
always necessary, to determine what a work means based in part on its artist's intentions.
At this point, there are plenty of other potential problems and objections for which
adequate answers would go beyond the scope of this thesis. Group authorship of works is
one  such problem,  because  multiple  authors  of  the  same work could  intend opposite
meanings for some of the symbols within it.  For example, the author of a play could
intend a certain line to be tragic, the director could interpret the line as comedic, and an
actor performing the line could deliver it in a way that subverts both their intentions. It is
possible that, in such a case, there are three objects: the play on paper, the mental image
of the play in the director's mind, and the actor's version of the play. Presumably, the
audience's version would be the same as the actor's upon a first viewing.
A potential objection to externalist intentionalism is that there is some qualitative
difference between the meanings we attribute to works and the intentions we attribute to
their artists. Even if both exist in the minds of audience members, perhaps meaning is
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more closely related to the sensory data of artworks than intention is. One response is that
we often conceive of works of art as having some features that were intended, even if
those features were produced by mistake. A large bold blotch of blue on an otherwise
ornate painting seems to confirm that its artist intended the painting to be subversive,
even if it was just a mistake. If there are certain features that we interpret as intentional in
works, the concept of intention can be linked with our sensory data in such cases, in the
same way meaning is.  In order to pursue this,  a wider discussion of the hierarchy of
mental concepts and stimuli would be necessary.
Other potential problems include whether any experience of a work can be similar
enough to any other experience of the same work for there to be objective knowledge of
works, and whether what we call works are just our own concepts of groups of physical
features, objects, or, in the case of live performances, actions. I will conclude this section
by considering how externalist intentionalism fits into a broader intentionalist theory of
art criticism.
5.2 Externalist Intentionalism and Carroll's Evaluative Criticism
In On Criticism, Carroll develops a comprehensive theory of art criticism. He argues that
criticism is “evaluation grounded in reasons.”137 The critic, he says, describes, classifies,
contextualizes, elucidates, interprets, and analyzes a work in order to evaluate it.138 Like
other modern intentionalists, Carroll subscribes to a form of the neo-Wittgensteinian view
137 Carroll, On Criticism, p. 153
138 Ibid., p. 153 and  passim. Carroll says criticism can concern “entire stylistic movements,” but this is
neither his main focus nor mine. (Ibid., p. 12) 
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of intention. In this section, I will compare and contrast his modern intentionalist theory
of criticism with the implications of externalist intentionalism.
Consistent with the views I defended in section 3.4 on the focus of evaluative
statements, Carroll says that “it is not the [work] per se that we are discussing. It is what
the pertinent people mean to be doing with the [work],” which means that “the object of
criticism is ... human doings.”139 He concludes that “the object of criticism is what the
artist performs,” so that we evaluate the artist's actions in making art “in terms of [her]
achievement.”140 Since he believes the aim of criticism is evaluation, and since, as a neo-
Wittgensteinian,  he  assumes  that  artists'  intentions  are  discernible  within  works,  he
regards  this  kind  of  evaluation  as  being  focused  on  works.141 But  such  a  focus  is
incompatible with externalist intentionalism.
Though it could be necessary for us to interpret a work as if it were created for
some purpose, if the evaluation of works were focused primarily on artists, with works
assuming a supportive but secondary role,  Carroll's view rests uncomfortably close to
biographical criticism.142 Furthermore, if, as I have argued, works are distinct from the
actions of artists,  Carroll's  criticism focuses on the wrong object.  Even if,  as he later
argues, evaluation concerns whether artists have acted to fulfill the conditions requisite
for what counts as achievement in the respective genres to which their works belong, his
theory implies that, for example, the intention to write a sonnet can result in a poem that
is  a  failed  sonnet,  rather  than  an  otherwise  beautiful  non-sonnet  poem.  Unless  we
139 Ibid., p. 48, both quotations.
140 Ibid., p. 52, both quotations.
141 Ibid., passim, and quite notably pp. 52, 81, and 83.
142 Ibid., p. 51.
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subscribe to neo-Wittgensteinian intentionalism, the former verdict concerns the actions
of creating the poem, while the latter concerns its physical features.143 If we modify his
view so that it shifts away from this primary focus on the success of artists' actions, we
can approach a version that better supports intentionalist criticism.
Instead of evaluating whether actions can be reconciled with intentions, we could
evaluate works based on whether they conform to or subvert genre rules, irrespective of
whether  one  enjoys  them.144 But  it  is  unclear,  in  this  case,  who  determines  which
constraints or emphases each genre imposes. If we hold that individual artists determine
the genre rules of their own works, we would need a theory like Carroll's in order to
understand any work at all.  If we hold that critics determine these rules, however, it's
possible that intentional subversions of certain genres would be seen, not as revolutionary,
but as failures. There are problems for either possibility, though it would be absurd to say
that, in standard critical practice, we treat art as if there were no genres.
Even though no work contains a metaphysical property that determines its genre,
works comprise sets of features that people categorize for easy identification. The impetus
behind any aesthetic categorization may be for the sake of gaining information, or for
locating  something  one  finds  useful  or  enjoyable,  or  both.  If  the  impetus  is  to  gain
information, categorization might frame a work in a way that makes some features stand
out, and thus makes the work more understandable. In this search for knowledge about a
work, we seem further to understand our concepts of the genres it conforms to. However,
this search could lead a  critic to devalue the work itself as the primary object of criticism,
143 Ibid., p. 167.
144 Ibid., p. 179, in which a similar claim is explored, albeit from a neo-Wittgensteinian perspective.
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and instead focus  on the knowledge of  the  genre  one  can  infer  from the  work.  This
presents us with a kind of paradox, similar to one we face in daily life. We determine
whether we use words correctly based upon shared dictionaries (mental or written), yet
our usage of those words over time determines what the dictionaries' definitions of those
same words are. If we plan to dissect a phrase in order to understand someone properly,
we need to find out what dictionary the speaker consulted while speaking that phrase. Yet
the phrase could be a new, formative usage of the words specific to it, unanticipated by
any definition in the relevant dictionaries before it was spoken.145 In the same way, we
determine what genre a work belongs to,  and what it  means. We can modify existing
genre  rules,  or  create  new genres  based  on  the  use  of  symbols  in  works,  but  these
modifications need, in some sense, to be based upon actual uses of symbols in works.146
Regardless of who determines the rules of a genre, if the way we evaluate a work depends
upon what genre it belongs to, this seems to suggest that the work can determine, in terms
of its own features, whether it succeeds in a given genre. In lesser known genres like
electroacoustic music,  or post-new wave, it  appears that many works themselves help
people determine the very genre rules that determine whether they count as successful. If
the features  of  works determine whether  they succeed aesthetically,  and if  evaluating
success is the goal of criticism, there seems no point at all to it, other than pointing others
in the direction of works that one enjoys.
145 Though this recalls my discussion in section 2.4 of evolving word usages, my argument here is not
aimed at the same conclusion.
146 It's also possible that a modification of the parameters of a genre actually creates a new genre instead of
modifying an old one.
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5.3 Evaluation as Preference
Since  evaluation,  neither  in  Carroll's  sense  nor  in  genre-based  criticism,  appears
adequately to  determine whether  a  work succeeds,  evaluative criticism may be just  a
matter of personal preference. Although I often claim that some work is better or worse
than another, I base this claim primarily on my personal enjoyment of the work, not on
whether  its  artist  succeeded  in  realizing  most  of  her  intentions,  or  how  its  features
conform to or subvert genre rules. Critics often determine whether a work conforms to a
certain genre's  standards  of  excellence,  and whether  it  successfully realizes  its  artist's
intentions and actions, thereby providing the very kinds of evaluative criticism that help
inform audiences about what works mean. But neither success of actions nor conformity
to genre rules is the primary focus of evaluation, since each is, in essence, as unimportant
in determining the worth of a work as determinations about what a word means in a
particular language. Worth, success, and any other form of value is external to works,
which suggests that focusing on features of works in order to determine some fact about
the rules we use to look at them is not work-focused criticism. While it is entirely possible
that  my view is  too austere,  and that  I  have failed to  notice some important  facet  of
evaluation that does in fact bring works to the fore in this kind of criticism, I am inclined
to conclude that evaluation is a secondary part of criticism, which might even count as a
framing device for works' features rather than a determination of them.
This is not to say that evaluation is irrelevant to criticism. In fact, most critics do
evaluate works in the ways I discuss above. I believe it is the fact that we find works
enjoyable that we develop and refine such concepts of genres and success for them. We
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want to praise the objects that bring us the most enjoyment, and, in turn, the people who
make them. As such, praise of objects and the people who make them is prompted by our
enjoyment of art. Yet it is not the critics' praise that is the most important aspect of their
criticism.  The  reasons  that  ground  that  praise,  in  the  form  of,  to  quote  Carroll,
“description, classification, contextualization, elucidation, interpretation, [and] analysis,”
are what help people understand the meanings we can justly ascribe to works.147 This
deeper understanding helps people to determine better what works mean, and to enjoy
them more fully. What matters, then, is not the destination of our criticism, but how we
get there.
In  this  section,  I  have  examined  a  few  potential  objections  to  externalist
intentionalism,  before  focusing  on  Carroll's  concept  of  criticism.  I  argued  that  his
evaluative criticism based upon artistic achievement draws our focus away from the work
at hand. I showed that genre-based success focuses on our definitions of genres rather
than the works we count as conforming to them, and that it is unclear who can determine
success in any genre.  Due to these problems,  I  concluded that  evaluative criticism is
based upon personal preference, and that the important component of criticism, evaluative
or not, is the additional insight into works' meanings that criticism provides us.
147 Carroll, On Criticism, p. 84. We can ascribe meaning correctly to works given the aesthetic languages
they conform to, which are determined by their artists' intentions, critical classifications, and so on.
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Summary of Thesis
In  this  Master's  thesis,  I  have  argued  for  the  relevance  of  artists'  intentions  to  their
artworks.  In  section  one,  I  showed  that  although  human  intentions  determine  which
objects  are  artworks,  meaning  is  not  an  internal  property  of  artworks,  and  aesthetic
qualities are just terms or mental conclusions that we use to categorize their  features.
Since the meaning we ascribe to artworks is external to them, other external information,
including reports of artists' intentions, is not irrelevant to our understanding of artworks. I
call this view externalist intentionalism.
In  section  two,  I  argued  that  anti-intentionalism is  not  a  viable  alternative  to
externalist  intentionalism  for  a  few  reasons.  First,  I  objected  to  a  modification  of
Socrates's view in Plato's Ion, establishing that artists' actions are the result of intentions
rather than unintentional inspiration. Second, I examined three interpretations of Roland
Barthes's  argument,  showing  that  the  difference  between  artistic  actions  and
conversational  actions  addressed  to  a  particular  agent  does  not  invalidate  the  critical
practice of interpreting works linguistically. Third, I explained that Beardsley's view that
works are self-sufficient entities ignores the fact that languages are external to works.
Finally, I objected to Wimsatt and Beardsley's view on the grounds that we can fail to
understand ironic features of works if we don't have knowledge of artists' intentions, in
cases where such attributions of irony do not contradict those works' features. I concluded
from these problems with anti-intentionalism that information external to works can help
us understand and enjoy them more fully.
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In section three,  I discussed neo-Wittgensteinian intentionalism, and found that
Anscombe's supposedly neo-Wittgensteinian argument actually shows that we can often,
though not always, infer intentions from actions. This view is compatible with externalist
intentionalism, which suggests that some philosophers have misunderstood or mislabelled
her work. I showed that the neo-Wittgensteinian intentionalism Lyas and others support,
according to which intentions are directly perceivable in artworks, is not persuasive for
two  reasons.  First,  if  only  successfully  realized  intentions  are  perceivable  in  works'
features, the claim that there is an additional intentional feature of works is unnecessary.
Second,  if  unsuccessful  intentions  exist  as  metaphysical  properties  of  works,  neo-
Wittgensteinians provide no explanation for how these properties are created in works
that do not display commensurate features. I finished the section with a more nuanced
interpretation of neo-Wittgensteinian intentionalism, which showed that adherents of the
view confuse the intentions agents have while acting with the works that are products of
artistic  actions.  This  kind  of  intentionalism  denies  the  importance  of  intentions  in
interpreting  meaning,  given  that  intentions  are  separate  from artworks,  yet  it  cannot
adequately  support  anti-intentionalism  either.  In  light  of  these  problems,  neo-
Wittgensteinian intentionalism is not a viable alternative to externalist intentionalism.
In section four, I examined allusion,  and the special  problems it  poses to anti-
intentionalist  and  neo-Wittgensteinian  views  of  art's  metaphysics.  I  first  developed  a
definition of allusion based on Hermeren's and Ross's views, holding that a successful
allusion must be able to be understood by more people than its artist. I then proceeded to
show  that  though  intentions  are  separate  from  works,  they  determine  what  the
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corresponding allusions refer to. Since allusions can be made understandable by reports
of  artists'  intentions,  and  since  they  do  not  operate  in  a  way incompatible  with  the
metaphysics endorsed by externalist intentionalism, this view of allusion further supports
my argument.
Finally, in section five, I dealt with some potential objections to my view, and then
discussed evaluative criticism. I argued that Carroll's view of criticism does not focus on
works, but rather on whether artists' actions count as achievements in a particular genre.
Since his view seems to place too much import on intentions for work-focused criticism,
leading to the conclusion that some works might count as failed attempts in a certain
genre  rather  than  otherwise  aesthetically  valuable  works,  I  considered  an  alternative,
genre-based view of evaluative criticism. I argued that if we base evaluative criticism
upon  conformity  to  genre  rules,  we  run  the  risk  of  focusing  on  the  conditions  that
constitute success in particular genres rather than on the works we see as conforming to
those genres. I then explained that it is unclear who determines success within genres. If
critics do, I argued, subversive or revolutionary works might not succeed, while if artists
do, works might never be able to fail. In light of these problems, I suggested that critical
evaluation is reducible to personal preferences, and that, despite the possible need for
evaluation in criticism, the information we gather about works is the most important part.
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